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In this Article the authors examine how the Supreme Court exercises its
virtually unfettered control over case selection. With its certiorari power,
the Court sets its direction and influences the country's social agenda, yet
relatively little is known about how the Justices choose cases because of the
intense secrecy that envelops this aspect of their work. Using data from the
private papers of retired Justices, the authors analyze whether, and to what
extent, the Justices cast their votes to grant or deny cases based on whether
they expect to win on the merits. More specifically, the authors analyze
whether Justices who are ideologically aligned on the merits also tend to
vote together at the case selection stage and, similarly, whether Justices
who are ideologically opposed on the merits also tend to cast opposing
votes at the case selection stage. In addition, the authors look more closely
at the Justices' voting behavior from the certiorari stage through the merits
stage in two special sets of cases-those granted unanimously and those
granted by a minority-to see whether the Justices' votes on certiorari are
merely a precursor to their votes on the merits. The authors find that
although there is a substantial strategic element in the Justices' case
selection decisions, jurisprudential and institutional considerations play a
significant role as well.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most critical aspects of the Supreme Court's work is also its
least understood-the granting of certiorari. With its decisions about which
cases to take up for full review on the merits, the Court shapes not only its
* Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. B.A. 1983, University of the
Pacific; J.D. 1986, Boalt Hall School of Law; B.C.L. 1988, Oxford University. We thank
Steve Kautz for reading and commenting on an earlier draft and Banks Miller for his
advice and assistance on the statistical analysis. We also wish to thank Jarrod Shirk,
Carrie Lymanstall, and Lindsey McCarron for their invaluable help with the research of
this Article and Minerva Sneed for her careful assistance with the data. Capital University
Law School supported the preparation of this Article with a generous research stipend.
** Member of the Ohio, District of Columbia, and Supreme Court bars; Adjunct
Professor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. B.A. 1981, Michigan State
University; M.A., 1983, Oxford University; J.D. 1986, University of Chicago Law
School. Mr. Cordray served as a law clerk to Justices Byron R. White and Anthony M.
Kennedy, and as Ohio State Solicitor.
2 OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 69:1
own legal agenda, but also the country's agenda on socially controversial and
politically sensitive issues. Indeed, even the Court's decisions not to take up
particular issues are significant, as delay may allow for the personnel on the
Court to change, for the political climate in which the case is heard to shift,
or for the relevant case law to evolve-any of which can decisively influence
the ultimate resolution of those issues.
Decisionmaking at the certiorari stage may thus be "second to none in
importance," 1 yet relatively little is known about how the Justices actually
decide which cases to grant for full consideration on the merits. The
certiorari process is conducted in secret; the Court merely announces whether
each petition for certiorari was granted or denied without revealing votes or
reasons. Moreover, the Justices exercise virtually unfettered discretion to
decide whether or not to grant review.
With the twin benefits of secrecy and complete discretion, each
individual Justice is free to cast his or her vote on any basis, including one
that is purely strategic. Indeed, a Justice's vote on certiorari could serve
merely as a preliminary vote on the merits. If the Justice is dissatisfied with
the result below and thinks that he or she can win on the merits, then the
Justice votes to grant the case, otherwise to deny it. Despite this possibility,
we have previously argued that the Justices' decisions on certiorari are based
on a complex and multidimensional set of considerations that also include
administrative, rule-based, and jurisprudential factors. 2 While there is little
doubt that a broad array of factors plays a role in the case selection process, it
remains unclear how great their role is in relation to the impact of merits-
oriented factors.
In this Article, we consider whether, and to what degree, a Justice's
decisionmaking at the certiorari stage is influenced by his or her view of the
merits of the cases under consideration. Using information on the Justices'
certiorari votes that we gathered from the private papers of Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, we compare the Justices' voting behavior
at the case selection stage in cases granted to their voting behavior at the
merits stage. We find that Justices who are ideologically aligned on the
merits tend to vote together on certiorari much more consistently than those
Justices who are ideologically opposed on the merits, suggesting that there is
a significant merits-oriented component to the Justices' certiorari formulas.
I William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U.
CH. L. REv. 473, 477 (1973).
2 See generally Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy
of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82
WASH. U. L.Q. 389 (2004) [hereinafter Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari]
(discussing the certiorari process and the factors that influence decisionmaking at the
certiorari stage).
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However, we also find that the rate of agreement between almost all Justices
is significantly lower on certiorari than it is on the merits, and that this
decrease is most pronounced for Justices who are ideologically aligned.
These results indicate that other factors also play an important role in the
Justices' decisionmaking on certiorari.
In addition, we look more closely at the Justices' voting behavior from
the certiorari stage through the merits stage in two special sets of cases-
those granted unanimously and those granted by a minority (that is, with the
minimum four votes required). In both sets of cases, we find that the Justices'
agreement at the certiorari stage does not merely presage their agreement
about the merits. Indeed, in our sample, more than one-quarter of the cases
granted unanimously resulted in a five to four decision on the merits,
indicating that many of the Justices voted to grant these cases based on their
sense of the Court's institutional responsibilities, rather than because they
were likely to win. Similarly, in more than one-third of the cases granted
with only four votes the Court reached a unanimous decision on the merits,
suggesting that many of the Justices who voted to deny these cases did so not
for ideological or strategic reasons, but rather because of concerns about the
quality or importance of the cases.
We begin with an overview of certiorari, discussing the Court's
processes and the factors that influence the Justices' decisionmaking. We
then embark on an analysis of the Justices' voting behavior using original
data that we compiled on voting alignments at the certiorari stage. This
analysis helps us to shed new light on the vexing issue of whether and to
what extent the Justices' votes on certiorari are more than just preliminary
votes on the merits. At the end of the Article, we provide several appendices
with specifics about the Justices' voting alignments on certiorari and on the
merits.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S CASE SELECTION PROCESS
The Court's decisionmaking process at the certiorari stage is
fundamentally different from traditional judicial decisionmaking. In stark
contrast to traditional judicial processes, case selection decisions are made
without constraining criteria, majority rule, public accountability, or collegial
deliberation. Indeed, the Justices' process for deciding which cases to grant
for full consideration on the merits provides the Justices with virtually
unfettered discretion.3
The Court's own Rule 10 sets out the considerations that the Court takes
into account in determining whether to grant or deny certiorari as follows:
3 See generally id at 400-06 (discussing the lack of constraint on decisioninaking at
the certiorari stage).
2008]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
whether a lower court of last resort (1) "has entered a decision in conflict
with" another such court on "an important federal question"; (2) "has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings ... as to
call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power"; (3) "has decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by
this Court"; or (4) "has decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court."'4 This rule, however,
pointedly exerts no restraint on the Justices' decisionmaking, emphasizing
that review "is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion," and that the
criteria noted are "neither controlling nor fully measuring [of] the Court's
discretion." 5
This discretion is further enhanced by the secrecy with which the Court
acts on petitions; no record of the Court's vote is ever published, and
typically no explanation of the Court's decision is ever provided.6 As a
4 See SuP. CT. R. 10(a)-(c). The full text of the rule states:
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A
petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. The
following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion,
indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter; has
decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a
state court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for
an exercise of this Court's supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United States
court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important
question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has
decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions
of this Court.
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of
erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.
5 See SuP. CT. R. 10. See also H.W. PERRY, DECIDING To DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING
IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 221 (1991) ("Fundamentally, the definition of
'certworthy' is tautological; a case is certworthy because four justices say it is
certworthy."); Sanford Levinson, Strategy, Jurisprudence, and Certiorari, 79 VA. L. REV.
717, 736 (1993) (reviewing PERRY, supra) ("[I]t seems difficult indeed to read the
Court's own Rule 10 as anything other than an invitation to balancing, to the making of
'political choice(s)' about what is 'important' enough ... ").
6 Occasionally the background section of the Court's opinion on the merits will
briefly indicate why the Court accepted the case for review, but even then substantive
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result, the case selection process is freed from precedential constraints,
relieving the Justices of any obligation of consistency from case to case.7
In addition, the Justices engage in almost no collective deliberation about
which cases they will grant. The initial review of the approximately 7,000
petitions that are filed each term is done individually by each Justice, with
the help of his or her law clerks. 8 Some commentators have suggested that
the "cert pool,"9 which an increasing number of Justices have joined over the
years, tends to homogenize the Court's consideration of petitions for review
and thereby create an artificial uniformity of voting behavior. 10 But there is
reasons are rarely given. See S. Sidney Ulmer, The Decision to Grant Certiorari as
Indicator to Decision "On the Merits," 4 POLITY 429, 432 (1972) (describing a study
which demonstrated the rarity with which the Court explained its reasons for granting or
denying a case). See generally Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some
Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 COLuM. L. REv. 1643, 1723-
25 (2000) (discussing the effects of secrecy).
7 See John M. Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 541, 556-57
(1958) (noting the lack of precedential constraint); Hartnett, supra note 6, at 1723 (same).
This secrecy is justified on two grounds. The first is that processing thousands of
petitions each term does not permit the use of more elaborate procedures. See William H.
Rehnquist, Sunshine in the Third Branch, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 559, 561 (1977) (explaining
that "because there are approximately 4,000 [petitions for review], as opposed to 150
decisions on the merits, there is simply not the time available to formulate statements of
reasons why review is denied or appeals are affirmed or dismissed without argument").
The second is that the Court wants the flexibility to wait for the "right" case, to allow
"percolation" of the issue in the lower courts, and to control the size of its docket. See,
e.g., Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court,
136 U. PA. L. REv. 1067, 1119 (1988) ("[E]ven once the Court decides that a certain issue
is certworthy, it is under no obligation to take the first case that presents it .... The
Court's institutional interest, rather than the interest of the parties, is the determining
factor .. "); Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. PIar. L.
REv. 673, 689-91 (1990) (discussing the pros and cons of percolation).
8 See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 5, at 147-49 (quoting Justices saying that there is
virtually no interchamber discussion on certiorari petitions prior to conference); Gregory
A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda Building in the Supreme Court,
24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 807, 827 (1990) [hereinafter Caldeira & Wright, Discuss List]
(noting that "the makeup of the discuss list is the summation of a series of individual
calculations largely free of collective interaction").
9 Through the "cert pool," a group of Justices allow their law clerks to share the task
of preparing memoranda summarizing the petitions for review. See Margaret Meriwether
Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court's Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 737, 790-91 (2001) [hereinafter Cordray & Cordray, Plenary Docket] (describing
the operation and growth of the cert pool).
10 See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECIsION: How THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES
CASES 257-58 (1996) (noting criticisms of the cert pool); Kenneth W. Starr, The
Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN.
L. REv. 1363, 1376-77 (2006) (decrying the use of the cert pool and its perceived effect
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strong evidence that the pooling of law clerks has little systematic impact on
certiorari decisionmaking by individual Justices.I'
Unless at least one Justice places a case on the "discuss" list, the petition
is simply denied. 12 Cases that make it onto the discuss list do receive some
collective consideration before they are voted on in conference, 13 but because
of the intense demands of the Justices' schedules, this discussion tends to be
quite perfunctory. 14 In consequence, the certiorari process is "relatively
atomistic with decisions being made within chambers and the outcome on
cert. being primarily the sum of nine individual decision processes."', 5
on the Justices); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Gatekeepers: The Role of Law
Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEx. L. REV. 947, 968-97 (2007) (reviewing TODD
C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006) and ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN,
SORCERERS' APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT (2006)) (using data from cert pool memos to suggest that, with eight Justices now
participating in the cert pool, the law clerks' recommendations have greater influence).
11 See Cordray & Cordray, Plenary Docket, supra note 9, at 790-93 (arguing that
the cert pool does not affect the Justices' decisionmaking on certiorari); Barbara Palmer,
The "Bermuda Triangle? ": The Cert Pool and Its Influence Over the Supreme Court's
Agenda, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 105, 106-20 (2001) (using statistical evidence to show
that the cert pool has remarkably little influence on certiorari voting). Also, circulation of
a clerk's summary memorandum to the Justices does not constitute collegial deliberation
among the Justices.
12 See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 13 (1983) (describing the "discuss" list and the "dead" list); Byron R. White, The
Work of the Supreme Court: A Nuts and Bolts Description, 54 N.Y. ST. B. J. 346, 349
(1982) (same); see also PERRY, supra note 5, at 85-91 (same); Caldeira & Wright,
Discuss List, supra note 8, at 809-13 (same).
13 The Justices usually conference on Wednesday and Friday during argument
weeks and at the end of each recess. See White, supra note 12, at 383; DAVID M.
O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 198-207 (6th ed.
2003). As of 1990, there were normally forty to fifty cases discussed at each conference.
See Caldeira & Wright, Discuss List, supra note 8, at 812.
14 See PERRY, supra note 5, at 149. The Justices must review thousands of petitions
for certiorari each year. Chief Justice Hughes felt that the Court could allot no more than
32 minutes to each petition that was actually discussed at conference. See Edwin
McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice Hughes, 63
HARv. L. REV. 5, 14 (1949). Professor Hart estimated that each Justice can spend only
about 20 minutes in total on each nonfrivolous petition, including all the time needed to
read and become familiar with the case materials. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Time Chart
of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 88 (1959).
15 PERRY, supra note 5, at 163. Put differently, "the extent to which the nine Justices
operate as 'nine little law firms' is maximized here." Cordray & Cordray, Plenary
Docket, supra note 9, at 783 (quoting BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: How THE
SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 6 (1996) (attributing this formulation to "a number of"
Justices)).
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III. FACTORS INFLUENCING CASE SELECTION DECISIONS
Because decisionmaking at the certiorari stage is both atomistic and
unfettered, the voting behavior of each Justice is constrained only by his or
her own sense of what kinds of cases merit the Court's attention. 16 Justice
Harlan neatly explained the Justices' own widely-shared view: "[f]requently
the question whether a case is 'certworthy' is more a matter of 'feel' than of
precisely ascertainable rules."' 17 But although it is just a "feel," it seems to
remain fairly stable over time for each Justice, at least with regard to the
relative quantity of cases he or she votes to grant.18 This consistency suggests
that each Justice has his or her own internal but durable formula for
determining which cases the Court should hear.
The precise content of these highly individualized formulas is ultimately
unknowable (even by the Justices themselves), but statistical research has
demonstrated that certain discrete factors do play a significant role in the
Justices' decisionmaking. Some of these factors derive from the substantive
considerations articulated in the Court's Rule 10, whereas others appear to be
more jurisprudential or administrative in nature, and still others are best
described as fundamentally ideological or strategic.
16 ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 166 (7th ed. 1993)
(observing that a case may be granted or denied for "any reason that the Court sees fit");
see also Eugene Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A. J. 253,
255 (1973) ("[I]nformed arbitrariness is at the very heart of the certiorari jurisdiction. The
justices are supposed to be motivated to grant or deny review solely by their individual
subjective notions of what is important or appropriate for review by the Court.").
17 Harlan, supra note 7, at 549. See also Brennan, supra note 1, at 479 (subscribing
"completely" to this observation); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1937-1975:
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 175-76 (1980) ("[T]he job here
[deciding whether to grant plenary review] is so highly personal, depending upon the
judgment, discretion, and experience and point of view of each of the nine of us . ..");
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 265 (1987)
("Whether or not to vote to grant certiorari strikes me as a rather subjective decision,
made up in part of intuition and in part of legal judgment.").
18 DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
114-15 (1980) (noting that conference votes from both the Vinson and the Warren Courts
show that the Justices tend "to be consistent in the strength of their propensity to vote for
review" and so the "rank order of the justices thus remained fairly constant over the
entire period," especially in periods of a "natural" Court where there were no personnel
changes). Although there are a few exceptions to this pattern in the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, overall there continues to be a marked consistency in voting behavior. See
Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 419, 440-41, 447-48
(discussing the overall consistency and explaining the aberrations).
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A. Rule-Based and Jurisprudential Factors
Several important factors flow from Rule 10 itself, which focuses on
whether the lower court decision creates a conflict and whether the case
presents an important federal question. 19 In particular, the existence of a
genuine conflict between the lower courts or between the lower court and a
Supreme Court precedent dramatically increases the probability that the
Court will grant a case. 20 Similarly, when the United States is a petitioner,
the Court is far more likely to grant the case.21 The Court consistently grants
over 50% of the Solicitor General's petitions for certiorari, whereas it grants
only about 3% of paid petitions filed by other parties.22 This is largely
because the key "importance" criterion for review is almost necessarily met
when the federal government seeks review, asserting that it is substantially
affected by a lower court decision or that decisional conflicts require it to
operate differently across the country.23 In addition, amicus curiae briefs
19 See SUP. CT. R. 10; see also supra notes 4 and 5 and accompanying text
(discussing the provisions of Rule 10).
20 See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1109, 1120 (1988) [hereinafter
Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests] ("Whenever actual conflict was present, the
likelihood that certiorari was granted jumped dramatically."); Stras, supra note 10, at
981-83 (noting that in the 2003-2005 Terms, approximately 70% of cases granted
involved a conflict among the lower courts); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Supreme Court's
Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 901, 906-
11 (1984) (demonstrating a significant relationship between the grant of certiorari and the
presence of genuine intercircuit conflict or conflict with Supreme Court precedent);
S. Sidney Ulmer, Conflict with Supreme Court Precedent and the Granting of Plenary
Review, 45 J. POL. 474, 474-77 (1983) (finding that the Court is more likely to grant
review in cases where the ruling conflicted with Supreme Court precedent).
21 See, e.g., Caldeira & Wright, Discuss List, supra note 8, at 829 (finding that the
presence of the United States as petitioner is a key determinant in the decisional
calculus); Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests, supra note 20, at 1115, 1121 (same);
Joseph Tanenhaus et al., The Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in
JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 111, 122-23 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963) (same).
22 See STERN ET AL., supra note 16, at 164 n.6; see also REBECCA MAE SALOKAR,
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAw 25 (1992) (finding that, between 1959
and 1989, the Solicitor General was successful in obtaining plenary review 69.78% of the
time, whereas private litigants were successful only 4% of the time).
23 The Solicitor General's success is also attributable in part to the rigorous
screening that he performs to cull out cases appropriate for review, as well as the general
expertise and quality of the lawyers in his office. See, e.g., STERN ET AL., supra note 16,
at 164 (noting that the Solicitor General's success "is due both to the fact that
government cases are likely to be of more general public importance and to the strictness
with which the office screens the cases lost by the government below before deciding to
petition for certiorari" by "apply[ing] the Supreme Court's own certiorari standards");
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filed in support of (or even in opposition to) the petition for certiorari
significantly increase the likelihood that the Court will grant review,
presumably because they signal the Justices that the case has broader social,
political, or economic significance. 24
Other, more jurisprudential considerations also play an important part in
each Justice's decisionmaking, because the central notion of what constitutes
an "important question" is inevitably colored by the Justice's own views on
an intricate web of other factors. Indeed, even a criterion that appears to be
objective-the existence of a conflict between the lower courts-carries only
as much weight in the overall mix as each Justice chooses to assign it. While
all of the Justices no doubt agree, on some level, that resolving conflicts
among the lower courts is an essential task of the Supreme Court,25 there is a
wide variance in the importance that individual Justices attach to achieving
uniformity in the application of federal law and thus in their inclination to
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 142 (1996)
(describing the Solicitor General's office as "superbly staffed").
24 See Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests, supra note 20, at 1111-12. Based on
data from the 1982 Term, the authors showed that when a case involves an actual conflict
or when the United States is the petitioner, the filing of just one amicus brief in support of
the petition increases the likelihood that the Court will grant certiorari by 40 to 50%, and
the filing of two or three amicus briefs increases the likelihood even more. See id. at
1119, 1122. Amicus briefs help to flag importance because they are expensive to prepare
($15,000 to $20,000 in 1988). See id at 1112.
Researchers have also suggested that a case is more likely to be granted if the court
immediately below reversed the lower court, or if a judge dissented from the decision.
See id. at 1115; Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Speaking Up: A Model of
Judicial Dissent and Discretionary Review, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 1, 2-21 (2006)
(analyzing how lower court dissenting judges communicate information to Supreme
Court Justices to promote certain cases for review). The Justices may also be more
inclined to grant cases in particular subject areas, such as civil liberties, but the research
in this area to date is inconclusive. Compare PROVINE, supra note 18, at 111 (finding
that, in the 1947-1957 Terms, the Justices were more inclined to vote for cases involving
civil rights and civil liberties) with Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests, supra note
20, at 1118 ("The Court, it appears, is little inclined to hear one particular type of case
over another-all else being equal. This finding, of course, runs counter to the
conventional wisdom."). In any event, these factors are far less influential than the three
major determinants of genuine conflict, the United States as petitioner, and the presence
of amicus briefs. See Caldeira & Wright, Discuss List, supra note 8, at 828-30.
25 See, e.g., Sandra Day O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 1, 5 (1984-85) ("[T]he most commonly enunciated reason for granting review in a
case is the need to resolve conflicts among other courts over the interpretation of federal
law."); PERRY, supra note 5, at 246 ("The overwhelming majority of my informants,
indeed almost all, listed [circuit conflicts] as the first and most important thing that they
looked for in a petition.").
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vote to grant cases on that basis.26
Another more jurisprudential element in the "feel" that individual
Justices have for which cases deserve plenary review is the extent to which
they believe that the Court should serve as a force for social change. Some
Justices feel that the Court should actively promote a social agenda,27 while
others believe that the Court should not seek to be an engine of societal
change. 28 These different conceptions of the Court's proper role in American
society have ramifications for the Court's decisions on case selection, as they
will help to determine how aggressively (or reluctantly) each Justice reaches
out for the types of cases that will effectuate social change. 29
A myriad of other factors also influence a Justice's case selection
decisions, such as his or her views on how the Court can best supervise and
26 Justice White, for example, fiercely advocated that a principal task of the Court is
"to provide some degree of coherence and uniformity in federal law throughout the land."
White, supra note 12, at 349. And he regularly pressed the Court to grant more cases
involving circuit conflicts. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. United States, 497 U.S. 1038, 1038
(1990) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Stevens, in contrast, has a
much greater tolerance for conflicts: "I would like to suggest, first, that the existence of
differing rules of law in different sections of our great country is not always an
intolerable evil and, second, that there are decisionmakers other than judges who could
perform the task of resolving conflicts on questions of statutory construction." John Paul
Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 183 (1982). See
generally Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 435-41
(discussing this variable in more detail).
27 Justice Brennan is the paradigm example of a Justice with this view. See, e.g.,
DAVID E. MARION, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.: THE LAW
AND POLITICS OF "LIBERTARIAN DIGNITY" 161-62 (1997) ("Whether construed in light of
the interpretation that Brennan gave to the judicial oath or the nature of the project to
which he was committed, his task involved nothing less than active judicial involvement
in shaping a way of life for the American people."); KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR
ALL: WILLIAM BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 164
(1993) (observing that Justice Brennan took "an active leadership role in trying to find
cases that would promote his reforms").
28 See William E. Nelson, Justice Byron R. White: His Legacy for the Twenty-First
Century, 74 U. COLO. L. REv. 1291, 1297-98 (2003) (contrasting "those who use power,
as did several justices of the Warren Court, to try to control the course of history so that
those who live after them will lead better lives" with "constitutional conservative[s] who
saw no major role for the Court in directing the course of the nation's social change");
see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-25 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The
Constitution is not a panacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor should this
Court, ordained as a judicial body, be thought of as a general haven for reform
movements.").
29 See generally Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 441-
49 (discussing this variable in more detail).
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guide the lower courts through precedent; 30 a special concern for, or a
particular interest in, certain areas of the law; 31 his or her views about the
optimal size of the docket;32 and his or her own personal capacity for work.33
Many of these factors---especially the rule-based factors which focus on
the presence of a conflict, the United States as petitioner, and amicus
briefs-undoubtedly play a significant role as the Justices cull through the
petitions, separating the frivolous from the nonfrivolous cases. 34 But within
the smaller subset of nonfrivolous petitions, it is unclear how strongly these
rule-based, jurisprudential, and administrative factors affect the Justices'
decisionmaking. Once a Justice has narrowed the list of candidates for
review to several hundred clearly meritorious petitions, how does he or she
decide among them? Is it with an eye to shaping an agenda for the Court
based on jurisprudential considerations, or is it with an eye to whether he or
she will likely win the cases on the merits? To gain a better sense of this, we
now look at the existing research on the influence of ideological and strategic
factors.
30 See id. at 441-49 (discussing how a Justice's view of the proper mode of
decisionmaking can influence his or her decisions about case selection).
31 See PERRY, supra note 5, at 262-63 (describing various interest areas for different
Justices, including capital cases, abortion, schools, criminal procedure, free speech, water
rights, tax cases, Indian cases, oil and gas, securities, administrative law, and national
security issues). Justices sometimes develop these interests through their experiences
prior to joining the Court, as well as in their service on it. See id. at 263 (quoting an
unidentified Justice saying, "We all have our own ideas of what is important that we
bring to the Court with us"); id. ("One frequent observation was that once a justice wrote
a seminal opinion in an area, he usually became very interested when cases were
petitioned in that area.").
32 See PROVINE, supra note 18, at 120 (concluding that the bulk of Justices during
the Burton-era "failed to vote often for review less because they were satisfied with
lower-court results than because they felt constrained by the limited capacity of the Court
for judicial decision making"); William J. Brennan, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Supreme
Court's Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230, 231 (1981) ("There is a limit to human
endurance, and with the ever increasing complexity of many of the cases that the Court is
reviewing in this modem day, the number 150 taxes that endurance to its limits.").
33 Justices White, Black, and Douglas, for example, all had a great capacity for work
and unusually high grant rates. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice
White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (2003) (opining that Justice White's "readiness to
take more cases reflects his extraordinary capacity to tackle hard jobs and get them
done"); PROViNE, supra note 18, at 117 ("The willingness of Black and Douglas to
involve the Court in this number of on-the-merits decisions indicates that they placed
little value on time-consuming methods of decision making. These men thus exhibited in
their case-selection behavior their own willingness to reach decisions quickly and to
justify them without ado.").
34 See infra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing Justices' estimates that
approximately 70% of petitions for review are obviously frivolous).
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B. Merits-Oriented Concerns
Researchers, primarily from the political science field, have used a
variety of approaches to investigate the issue of how motivated the Justices
are by their own ideological inclinations and their desire to win at the merits
stage. These studies have focused on whether the Justices' case selection
decisions are driven by the following: (1) their ideological preferences, so
that they tend to vote to grant cases in which they wish to reverse the result
below; and (2) their strategic calculations as to whether they can ultimately
win the cases on the merits.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that a Justice is more likely to vote
to grant a case when he or she disagrees with the result below.35 This data
suggests that ideology does motivate the Justices, because in many areas the
Justices' ideological preferences undoubtedly influence their views of
whether a case was decided rightly or wrongly.36 Chief Justice Rehnquist
recognized this fact, stating: "There is an ideological division on the Court,
and each of us has some cases we would like to see granted, and on the
contrary some of the other members would not like to see them granted. '37
The extent to which ideology influences the Justices' decisionmaking is
unclear, however. While studies have demonstrated a statistically significant
relationship between a Justice's vote to grant a case and his or her vote to
35 See Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as
Strategic Decision-Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson
Court, 57 J. POL. 824 (1995) (finding "overwhelming evidence that justices are reversal
minded in their certiorari votes"); see also Virginia Armstrong & Charles A. Johnson,
Certiorari Decision Making by the Warren and Burger Courts: Is Cue Theory Time
Bound?, 15 POLrrY 141, 149 (1982) (finding that in civil liberties and economic cases,
the conservative Burger Court "consistently accepted more petitions involving liberal
lower court decisions than those involving conservative lower court decisions"); Caldeira
& Wright, Organized Interests, supra note 20, at 1120 (finding a "clear tendency" by the
Burger Court to select cases decided liberally below); Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the
Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REv. 727, 759, 769 (2001)
(finding that the predominantly conservative Court from 1981-1987 was 5.5 times more
likely to grant a case raising an Equal Protection issue if the decision below was liberal).
36 See Lawrence Baum, Case Selection and Decisionmaking in the US. Supreme
Court, 27 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 443, 454-56 (1993) (arguing that, at the Supreme Court
level, where the result is often not dictated by precedent, a preference for error correction
likely has a strong ideological component); John F. Krol & Saul Brenner, Strategies in
Certiorari Voting on the US. Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 43 W. POL. Q. 335, 335
n.1 (1990) (same).
37 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1982: Hearings on Salaries and Expenses of the Supreme
Court of the United States Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 97th
Cong. 21 (1981) (testimony of Justice Rehnquist).
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reverse on the merits,38 there is no distinction made between cases in which a
Justice's inclination to reverse is based on ideology and those in which this
inclination is based on purely legal considerations. 39
Researchers have also considered whether the Justices engage in a
strategic voting calculation at the certiorari stage, taking into account not
only whether a case deserves plenary review, but also the likely outcome on
the merits.40 This type of voting is more sophisticated because, to achieve his
or her goal, the actor takes into account the probable actions of other relevant
actors, and thus does not necessarily vote in accord with his or her sincere
preferences. 41
3 8 See JAN PALMER, THE VINSON COURT ERA: THE SUPREME COURT'S CONFERENCE
VOTES 59-62 (1990) (finding a statistically significant relationship between voting to
grant certiorari and ultimately voting to reverse for all Justices during the Vinson era);
PROVINE, supra note 18, at 107-10 (finding that all Justices during the Burton period
were more likely to vote to reverse a case that they voted to review); Saul Brenner &
John F. Krol, Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States Supreme Court, 51 J.
POL. 828, 833 (1989) (finding that, over seven terms of the Vinson, Warren, and Burger
Courts, Justices who voted to reverse on the merits had a grant rate of 77.7%, whereas
Justices who voted to affirm had a grant rate of 59.1%); Ulmer, supra note 6, at 440
(finding a statistically significant relationship between the vote to grant and the vote to
reverse, and the vote to deny and the vote to affirm, for eight of the eleven Justices on the
Court from the 1947 to 1956 Terms).
39 While there is likely a strong ideological aspect in some areas, in many cases
granted (such as tax, bankruptcy, or patent law), it seems much more likely that purely
legal considerations will predominate in a Justice's decisional calculus. See Frank B.
Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 542 (1998) (reviewing LEE EPSTEIN &
JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)) (noting that the Court regularly
grants "cases that lack ideological or political import" and suggesting that this
demonstrates "the power of legal concerns").
40 See Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the
Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 561-71 (1999) (contending that strategic
voting is routine and substantially impacts the Court's docket); see also Saul Brenner,
The New Certiorari Game, 41 J. POL. 649, 651-55 (1979) (arguing that Justices who wish
to affirm the decision below have less to gain and more to lose, so more carefully
calculate the chances of winning on the merits than reverse-minded Justices); Boucher &
Segal, supra note 35, at 830-32, 836 (same; designating the Vinson Court Justices
"semistrategic"); Jan Palmer, An Econometric Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's
Certiorari Decisions, 39 PUB. CHOICE 387, 393-96 (1982) (finding a positive relationship
between voting to grant certiorari and voting with the majority on the merits in a study of
512 cases from the 1947-1956 Terms).
41 See Lee Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 783, 798-800 (2003) (explaining the difference between the attitudinal model, under
which actors behave in accordance with their sincere policy preferences, and the strategic
model, under which goal-oriented actors take into account the likely actions of other
relevant actors). Under the strategic model, the researcher may specify any type of goal
that the actors hold. See id. at 798. However, "[v]irtually every existing strategic account
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At the Supreme Court's case selection stage, strategic voting is quite
feasible because the Justices have sufficient familiarity with their colleagues'
inclinations to enable them to predict how they would vote on the merits. 42
Strategic voting can take a variety of forms, but the most common are the
"defensive denial," where a Justice votes against his or her own preference to
grant a case rather than risk an undesirable outcome on the merits, and the
"aggressive grant," where a Justice reaches out to grant a case to affirm and
thereby broaden the effect of a desirable result below.43
Debate about whether the Justices engage in strategic voting continues,
but there is mounting evidence that they do.44 Not only have Justices
acknowledged using such devices,45 but empirical research strongly indicates
that the Justices do act strategically to at least some extent.46
of judicial decisions posits that Justices pursue policy, that is, their goal is to see public
policy-the ultimate state of the law-reflect their preferences," id, and we do as well.
42 See PROVINE, supra note 18, at 126 (pointing out that the "justices work together
daily, often for years, so a colleague's reaction could often be anticipated"); see also
Caldeira et al., supra note 40, at 550 (noting that conditions are favorable for
sophisticated voting because certiorari decisions are secret, no justifications are given, the
cases are fungible, and the decision to grant often presages the outcome).
43 See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 39, at 80 (describing aggressive grants
and defensive denials); PERRY, supra note 5, at 198-212 (same); Caldeira et al., supra
note 40, at 558 (defining these terms and giving examples). Yet another strategic
behavior is when a Justice seeks a "good vehicle"--a case with a good set of facts-in
order to enhance his or her chances of driving doctrine in a particular way or convincing
a swing Justice to join. See PERRY, supra note 5, at 281-82 (discussing the importance
Justices attach to finding a good vehicle).
44 See, e.g., Caldeira et al., supra note 40, at 553-71 (providing strong empirical
evidence that strategic voting occurs regularly and substantially affects the composition
of the Court's plenary docket); Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United
States Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 405 (2002)
(opining that, although the debate over whether the Justices vote strategically will
continue, "the evidence, especially that offered by the most recent (and sophisticated)
studies, tips the scales substantially in favor of the strategic camp"). But cf PROVINE,
supra note 18, at 125-30, 172 (arguing that the Burton-era Justices did not consider the
likely result on the merits in case selection); Krol & Brenner, supra note 36, at 340-42
(doubting whether the Vinson Court in general considered likely outcome in case
selection, but recognizing that individual Justices may have done so).
45 See PERRY, supra note 5, at 198-202 (describing how each of the five Justices he
interviewed acknowledged-with varying degrees of approval-use of the defensive
denial); Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 2, at nn. 122-24 and
accompanying text (discussing various Justices' own observations on use of the defensive
denial).
46 In a widely-respected study of the Court's 1982 Term, the authors found that there
is a substantial relationship between a Justice's own ideological position and his or her
decisions on certiorari, and that the Justices consider the likely outcome on the merits in
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Still, it remains unclear how pervasively such ideological and strategic
factors may affect the Justices' decisionmaking. Not surprisingly, there is a
spectrum of opinions on the issue. Some contend that the Justices rarely take
into account such considerations, 47 others contend that the Justices do so
only in cases that they feel passionately about,48 and still others contend that
the Justices do so routinely.49
To get a clearer picture of the extent to which merits-oriented
considerations influence the Justices at the case selection stage, we compared
their voting behavior on certiorari to that of other Justices with whom they
are ideologically aligned and with whom they are ideologically opposed. In
addition, we looked more carefully at cases that the Court granted
unanimously to assess whether the Justices' agreement in such cases is
reflective of their agreement about the merits, or whether it is lodged in more
institutional and jurisprudential concerns about the Court's responsibility to
making those decisions. See Caldeira et al., supra note 40, at 553-71. In the study, the
authors used all of the petitions for certiorari in the 1982 Term (not merely those granted)
and measured the Justices' individual preferences based on their votes on the merits in
similar cases in the past. They then used this data to gauge how the Court as a whole
would likely decide a case on the merits. See id. at 559-60. Their results were "also
robust: [holding] despite controls for the effect of case quality, direction of the lower
court decision, and interjustice influence at the certiorari stage." Id. at 566. Further, they
determined that this strategic behavior had a substantial effect on the content of the
Court's docket; they estimated that the strategic use of "defensive denials" resulted in at
least eighteen omissions from the Court's plenary docket in the 1982 Term. See id. at
566-70.
47 PROVINE, supra note 18, at 125-30, 172 (contending that the Burton-era Justices
did not act strategically in case selection); Krol & Brenner, supra note 36, at 340-42
(doubting whether the Vinson Court in general acted strategically in case selection, but
recognizing that individual Justices may have done so); David R. Stras, The Incentives
Approach to Judicial Retirement, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1417, 1430 (2006) (rejecting the
notion that "most Justices are motivated solely by their own policy preferences").
48 See PERRY, supra note 5, at 274-82. Perry contended that in most cases the
Justices follow a "jurisprudential mode" of decisionmaking, where in essence they take
each nonfrivolous petition through a series of gates, considering whether there is a
conflict in the circuits, how important the issue is, how urgent resolution of the issue is,
and whether the particular case is a good vehicle substantively and procedurally. See id.
at 277-79. In those cases where a Justice cares deeply about a particular issue, though, he
or she employs the "outcome decision mode," where "the first thing that the justice does
is try to make an assessment of whether or not he will win on the merits. If he thinks he
will not, he will vote to deny the case." ld at 280. If, on the other hand, "the justice
thinks he will win on the merits, and if [the case] allows him to move doctrine in the way
he wishes," then the Justice will vote to grant. Id. at 265.
49 See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 293
(2005) ("[C]entral to positive scholarship is the notion that the Justices are strategic in
using their almost unlimited control over their docket to manage their agenda along
ideological terms.").
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review certain kinds of cases. We also looked closely at cases granted with
only four votes to determine whether the Justices' disagreement in such cases
seems to be based on their disagreement about the merits, or whether it
reflects a division over the need for the Court to afford the case plenary
review.
IV. VOTING ALIGNMENTS AT THE CASE SELECTION STAGE
As the Justices undertake their initial cut to determine which petitions are
potentially meritorious, the most basic legal criteria-such as whether the
case presents a federal question, whether the judgment below is final, and
whether there are independent state grounds for the decision below-
undoubtedly predominate in their decisionmaking. 50 And in many cases,
straightforward rule-based considerations-such as whether the case presents
a conflict among the lower courts or whether it has sparked any interest from
third-party groups filing as amici-yield a clear assessment that the petition
does not justify full briefing and argument. 51 Indeed, the Justices themselves
have commented that approximately 70% of the petitions filed are obviously
frivolous and easily rejected.52 But each term, the initial culling process still
leaves well over a thousand cases that could generously be viewed as
potentially meritorious, and surely several hundred petitions that are
"certworthy" in the sense that they are excellent candidates for plenary
review.
What remains unclear is how significantly the Justices' decisionmaking
in this subset of nonfrivolous petitions is influenced by merits-based factors,
namely ideological and strategic considerations about whether victory can be
achieved in a particular case and how a decision in that case will drive the
further evolution of legal doctrine. Merits-oriented factors obviously cannot
fully account for the differences in the Justices' voting records on certiorari.
50 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 478 (providing examples of petitions for review that
are "clearly frivolous"); PERRY, supra note 5, at 222-26 (giving examples of frivolous
certiorari petitions described to him in interviews with Justices and clerks).
51 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (setting out Rule 10); see also PERRY,
supra note 5, at 277-79 (suggesting that, at least in cases where they do not care strongly
about the outcome, the Justices make their decisions based on a series of legal
considerations such as whether a conflict exists).
52 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 479 (noting that "the Court is unanimously of the
view in 70% of all docketed cases, that the questions sought to be reviewed do not even
merit conference discussion"); White, supra note 12, at 349 ("Chief Justice Taft told
Congress in 1925 that about 60% of the cases filed were obviously without merit and
should not have been filed at all. It is not much different today. About 70% of the cases
filed do not make the discuss list and are unanimously denied. Most of these cases take
very little time.").
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Even a simple look at the quantity of votes cast on certiorari shows that more
is at work than just maximizing victory and minimizing defeat. 53 Justice
White, for example, voted with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell
approximately 80% of the time on the merits, and yet he cast dramatically
more votes to grant certiorari than they did. 54 To take another striking
illustration, even during a period in which he stood consistently as a key
swing vote on the merits, Justice Kennedy typically voted less frequently to
grant new cases than almost any other Justice. 55 By contrast, Justice
Blackmun was one of the most frequent dissenters towards the end of his
tenure, and yet he consistently ranked among the top three Justices with
respect to number of votes to grant cases. 56 But how significant are merits-
oriented considerations in the Justices' case selection formulas?
For a new perspective on the extent to which the Justices' certiorari
decisions in nonfrivolous cases are driven by their view of the merits, we
compared their voting patterns at the two decision stages. In particular, we
looked at whether Justices who are ideologically aligned on the merits also
tend to vote together at the certiorari stage, and whether Justices who are
ideologically opposed on the merits also tend to disagree at the certiorari
53 See Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 416-18.
54 Over the terms that the Justices overlapped in our survey, Justice White voted
with Chief Justice Burger 84% of the time and with Justice Powell 78% of the time in
cases on the merits. These figures come from the Harvard Law Review's annual recap of
the Supreme Court terms. These statistics are found in the first issue of each volume of
the Harvard Law Review; Volumes 98-108 include the statistics for the 1983-1993
Terms, respectively, and will be cited hereinafter as "Supreme Court Statistics." On
certiorari, Justice White voted to grant an average of 223 cases per term during this
period, whereas Chief Justice Burger voted to grant an average of 138 cases per term and
Justice Powell voted to grant an average of 118 cases per term.
55 During each of the 1991-1993 Terms, Justice Kennedy dissented on the merits
fewer times than any other Justice. See Supreme Court Statistics, supra note 54. Yet in
each of those terms, he had either the second or third lowest number of votes to grant
certiorari.
56 During each of the 1991-1993 Terms, Justice Blackmun was either the most or
second-most frequent dissenter on the merits. See Supreme Court Statistics, supra note
54. Yet in each of those terms, he had either the second or third highest number of votes
to grant certiorari. Similar examples from the Vinson Court include Justice Jackson, who
generally won on the merits but voted infrequently to grant review, and Justices Douglas
and Black, who frequently lost on the merits but ranked at the top in votes to grant
review. See PALMER, supra note 38, at 56-57 (showing that on the Vinson Court, Justice
Jackson ranked at or near the bottom in voting to grant review, while Justices Douglas
and Black were at the top); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATrTUDES
AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1946-1963, at 103-13 (1965) (placing
Justice Jackson as one of the "moderate conservatives" whose votes were most often
decisive in merits cases; placing Justices Black and Douglas as "liberals" who often
ended up dissenting in merits cases).
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stage. We also took a closer look at two special sets of cases: those that are
granted unanimously and those that are granted by a minority (that is, with
only four votes). Specifically, we analyze whether the vote on certiorari is
mirrored on the merits, or whether the Justices are voting in these cases
based on institutional and jurisprudential concerns.
To gauge the ideological compatibility of the Justices, we relied on the
Harvard Law Review's annual statistical recaps, which provide data on
voting alignments in merits cases for each pair of Justices. That data shows
the frequency of agreement between each pair of Justices in cases decided on
the merits, and thus provides a useful measure of the extent to which the
Justices are ideologically in (or out of) sync with each other. 57
Because the Justices' votes on certiorari are never published, they are not
included in the statistical recaps, but information on these votes is available
in the papers of retired Justices. We gathered data on the Justices' case
selection votes for the 1983 through the 1993 Terms from the docket books
of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall. 58 With this data, we compiled
the voting alignment information for each pair of Justices at the certiorari
stage, similar to that which the Harvard Law Review has regularly compiled
at the merits stage. The results for each pair of Justices both on certiorari and
on the merits are set out in Appendix A.
To make the comparison more meaningful, we limited our universe of
voting data to those petitions granted for plenary review on the merits.
Because so many petitions are frivolous, and because all of the Justices
simply vote to deny them, each pair of Justices is actually in agreement well
over 90% of the time. 59 Restricting the data to cases granted eliminated the
57 The Harvard Law Review treats two Justices as having voted together "whenever
they join in the same opinion, as indicated either by the reporter or by the explicit
statement of a Justice in the body of his own opinion." The Supreme Court, 1967 Term-
The Statistics, 82 HARV. L. REv. 93, 307 n.f (1968). It calculates the percentage of
agreement by dividing the number of times that one Justice voted with another in
opinions of the Court, opinions announcing the judgment of the Court, concurrences, and
dissents by the number of cases in which both Justices participated. See id.; see also id. at
301-02 (describing more fully how it calculates the statistics).
58 We treated all "Join-3" votes as votes to grant because they function as such. See
generally Cordray & Cordray, Plenary Docket, supra note 9, at 780-81 (discussing Join-
3 votes). A Join-3 vote is a vote to grant review if, but only if, at least three other Justices
vote in favor of review. See David M. O'Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert.
Pool, and the Supreme Court's Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 788-99
(1997) (describing the rise and subsequent decline of the Join-3 vote).
59 In 1983, 4222 new cases were filed; that number has steadily risen, reaching 6897
in 1993. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS
AND DEVELOPMENTS 62 tbl.2-2 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter EPSTEIN ET AL.,
COMPENDIUM]. During that same time period, no Justice voted to grant more than 275
cases in a term, and the great majority voted to grant fewer than 150.
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many frivolous cases and the superficial impression of overwhelming
agreement that they produce. Moreover, limiting the universe in this way
made the comparison between agreement on certiorari and agreement on the
merits much more direct.60 In other words, using the subset of cases granted
at the certiorari stage allows a much tighter comparison of the Justices'
voting behavior at the two decision points--case selection and then the
merits.61
A. Alignments at the Certiorari and Merits Stages
When the Justices take distinct looks at the same set of cases at these two
different points in their decisionmaking process, how closely related are their
voting alignments? To what extent is the decision on certiorari a precursor of
the decision on the merits? If a vote on certiorari is merely a preliminary vote
60 The comparison is not perfect for several reasons. First, we are comparing the
Justices' voting behavior in the term during which they cast the votes, whether on
certiorari or on the merits. Many of the cases granted in one term are not decided on the
merits until the following term (or even later), so the cases voted on at the certiorari stage
are not identical to the cases voted on at the merits stage in any given term. However, we
have averaged the voting alignments data over the terms that each pair of Justices sat
together, so the comparison is nonetheless quite good. Second, when a Justice retires or
joins the Court, he or she will have cast some votes at one decision point but not the
other. Third, we included all cases that were granted in our certiorari data set; these do
not line up perfectly with cases ultimately decided on the merits because some were later
dismissed (usually because the parties settled or the Court determined that the writ of
certiorari was improvidently granted).
61 The other alternative would be to use the data from a larger subset of the
nonfrivolous petitions filed. One way to do this would be to include all cases that
received at least one vote to grant. We opted against this approach because it too readily
allows the views of one idiosyncratic Justice to create a false sense of agreement among
the other eight Justices. Justice White, for example, voted to grant approximately 100
more cases per term than any other Justice. Including all of those cases would
significantly, but somewhat misleadingly, increase the rate of agreement among the eight
other Justices. We recognize, however, that use of only cases granted poses problems as
well. See Caldeira et al., supra note 40, at 552 (discussing downside of limiting data set
to cases granted). First, it does not capture certain kinds of strategic behavior, such as
successful defensive denials. Second, it fails to identify certain kinds of nonstrategic
behavior. Justice White, for example, voted to grant an unusually large number of cases
presenting conflicts among the lower courts. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. United States, 497
U.S. 1038, 1040 (1990) (Justice White, dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("[I]t is plain
enough to me that quite a number of the cases involving conflicts have been denied
review but could have been granted without presenting any danger of not being current in
our docket."). And Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to grant all death penalty cases.
See, e.g., EPsTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 39, at 60 n.c (1998) (discussing why Justices
Brennan and Marshall issued dissents from denial in all capital cases that the Court
refused to hear).
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on the merits, then one would expect to find that the voting alignments
among the Justices are basically the same at these two decision points. But
the manner and extent to which the voting alignments diverge should shed
light on the relative strength of the factors that are not merits-oriented-the
rule-based and jurisprudential factors-in the Justices' decisionmaking at the
certiorari stage.
1. Ordinal Rankings
The ordinal rankings of the pairings of Justices in the two sets of data-
alignment on merits votes and alignment on certiorari votes-confirm that
merits-oriented voting at the certiorari stage is a very real phenomenon.62
Over the eleven terms surveyed, with relatively few exceptions, Justices who
voted together most frequently on the merits also tended to vote together
most frequently on certiorari. Of the seventy-six pairings, for example,
Justices Brennan and Marshall voted together most frequently on the merits
and on certiorari. Justices Scalia and Thomas likewise ranked near the top of
both lists, as did Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor.63 The same
correlation also tended to hold with those pairings of Justices who voted
together least often on the merits. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Marshall, for example, were in the bottom nine pairings on both lists, as were
Justices Brennan and Scalia. 64 Indeed, as a general matter most Justices from
one end of the spectrum on merits voting were also grouped toward the same
end of the spectrum on certiorari voting.65
There were, however, some notable exceptions. Justice Blackmun, for
example, voted regularly with Justices Brennan and Marshall on the merits,
but did so far less frequently on certiorari. 66 And the same was true for
62 See Appendix B (setting out the pairings of Justices ranked ordinally by their
agreement rate on the merits, averaged over the eleven terms, along with their agreement
rate on certiorari and ordinal ranking on certiorari).
63 Justices Scalia and Thomas were fifth in agreement rate at the merits stage and
eighth at the certiorari stage; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor were ninth in
agreement rate at the merits stage and fourth at the certiorari stage. Id.
64 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Marshall were seventy-third in agreement rate
at the merits stage and seventy-first at the certiorari stage; Justices Brennan and Scalia
were seventy-second in agreement rate at the merits stage and sixty-eighth at the
certiorari stage. Id.
65 Twenty-three pairs of Justices had a merits agreement rate of over 75%; all but
five of them had an ordinal ranking on certiorari between one and twenty-six. See id.
Twenty pairs of Justices had a merits agreement rate of 55% or lower; all but four of
them had a certiorari ordinal ranking between fifty-one and seventy-six (i.e., in the
bottom twenty-five). See id.
66 In rankings, Justices Blackmun and Brennan were sixteenth on the merits and
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Justice Blackmun in the other direction as well; he voted infrequently with
Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist on the merits, but did so much
more regularly on certiorari. 67 In fact, Justice Blackmun voted more
frequently on certiorari with Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist
than he did with Justices Brennan and Marshall. Similar aberrations occurred
with several other pairs of Justices as well, 68 and reflect, at least in part, the
individuality of decisionmaking at the certiorari stage. They also indicate that
merits-oriented concerns are not the only consideration at the certiorari stage,
even in the narrow subset of cases that are by definition "certworthy."
Nevertheless, the correlation between the ordinal rankings of Justices at
the certiorari and merits stages was surprisingly close. At the certiorari stage,
there are many factors that could cause even closely allied Justices to stray,
including different subject area interests, different strategic assessments of
the likely outcome on the merits, and different emphases on the importance
of the various rule-based and jurisprudential considerations. In addition, the
Justices make their decisions in relative isolation, without the benefit of
much, if any, collegial deliberation about the cases. Despite all of this, the
ordinal rankings for agreement on certiorari largely carry over to the merits,
strongly indicating that ideological and strategic concerns about the outcome
on the merits play a significant role in the case selection decisions of most
Justices.
2. Overall Rates ofAgreement
While merits-oriented concerns are a significant factor, the overall rates
of agreement between Justices tend to show that decisions made at the
certiorari stage are more than just preliminary votes on the merits. In general,
the rate of agreement among the pairs of Justices was lower at the certiorari
stage than it was on the merits. Indeed, the rate of agreement was lower on
certiorari for sixty-two of the seventy-six pairs of Justices, and the difference
fiftieth on certiorari; Justices Blackmun and Marshall were eighteenth on the merits and
forty-eighth on certiorari. Id.
67 In rankings, Justices Blackmun and Thomas were seventy-fifth on the merits and
forty-fifth on certiorari; Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Rehnquist were fifty-seventh
on the merits and thirty-eighth on certiorari. Id.
68 Justice Powell, for example, when paired with Chief Justice Burger, ranked as
ordinal six in voting on the merits, but the same pairing sank to ordinal forty-two in
voting on certiorari. See Appendix B. The same was true for Justices Powell and Scalia,
who were twenty-fifth on the merits and fifty-seventh on certiorari. Id. Other aberrations
include Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, who were seventh on the merits and
forty-seventh on certiorari, and Justices Thomas and Stevens, who were dead last on the
merits (seventy-sixth) but forty-ninth on certiorari. Id.
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was statistically significant for all but one of those pairs. 69 Moreover, the
average rate of agreement for all pairs of Justices over the eleven terms
surveyed was 8% lower at the certiorari stage than at the merits stage.70
Particularly among Justices who were closely aligned on the merits, the
consensus was systematically less uniform on certiorari. Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist, for example, were aligned on the merits in almost
90% of the cases, but were aligned on certiorari in under 70% of the cases.71
At the other end of the ideological spectrum, Justices Brennan and Marshall
were aligned on the merits in 95% of the cases, but agreed on certiorari in
only 80% of the cases. 72
69 In the social sciences, a comparison is considered to be statistically significant if
there is only a 5% chance that the difference in means observed could have occurred by
chance alone; if the "t-statistic" is above 1.96, then the difference is statistically
significant at the .05 level. See EARL BABBLE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 448-
53 (6th ed. 1992) (discussing statistical significance); THOMAS H. WONNACOTr &
RONALD J. WONNACOTr, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS 291-96 (5th ed. 1990) (same).
In our sample of seventy-six pairs, sixty-two had agreement rates that were lower on
certiorari than on the merits, and the difference was statistically significant for sixty-one
of those pairs. See Appendix C (showing the level of statistical significance for each
pairing). Fourteen pairs had agreement rates that were higher on certiorari than on the
merits, and the difference was statistically significant for twelve of those pairs. See id.
Overall, therefore, 80.3% of the comparisons were statistically significant and in the
expected direction. Id. While the comparisons indicate a strong degree of statistical
significance, making it unlikely that the differences were caused by chance alone, we
caution that the comparisons were not exact. We compared the Justices' voting behavior
in the term during which they cast the votes, whether on certiorari or the merits.
However, many cases granted are not decided until the following term, so the cases voted
on are not identical in any given term. See supra note 60 (discussing this phenomenon).
Second, we did not consider the entire population of cases considered for certiorari, but
rather limited our analysis to cases granted for plenary review on the merits. See supra
notes 59-61 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons for limiting the data in this
way). While we believe that this limitation makes the comparison more useful, we
recognize that the certiorari agreement rates would be much higher if we included all
cases considered on certiorari.
70 The average rate of agreement at the merits stage was 66.1%; at the certiorari
stage it was 58.1%. See Appendix B.
71 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist were aligned on the merits in 89.5% of
the cases, but were aligned on certiorari only in 67.8% of the cases. Id. Similar results
were obtained for other conservative pairs: Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor
(87.6% to 66.1%), Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell (84.9% to 58.1%), and
Justices Powell and O'Connor (85.3% to 63.9%). Id. Occasionally the gap was narrower,
as between Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor (82.4% to 72.0%), Justices
Scalia and Thomas (84.9% to 70.2%), Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia (78.4%
to 66.3%), and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy (80.8% to 67.9%). Id.
72 Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall were aligned on the merits in 95.0% of the
cases, but were aligned on certiorari in 80.7% of the cases. Id. Similar results were
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Nonetheless, occasional pairs of Justices agreed more frequently on
certiorari than they did on the merits. Interestingly, all of the fourteen pairs
for whom this was true included Justice Ginsburg (for whom we have data
only from her first term on the Court), Justice Blackmun (whose certiorari
behavior was idiosyncratic in a variety of ways), Justice Scalia, or Justice
Thomas. 73 Moreover, the agreement rate on certiorari was generally only
slightly higher for these pairs of Justices. Only the two pairs with the widest
disparities on the merits-Justice Thomas and Justice Stevens, and Justice
Thomas and Justice Blackmun-had a substantially higher rate of agreement
on certiorari than they did on the merits. 74
Again, however, the great majority of Justices had a lower agreement
rate at the certiorari stage than they did on the merits. This result suggests
that voting on certiorari is somewhat more complicated for the Justices than
voting on the merits, and involves a greater array of competing
considerations. It may well reflect that the Justices are putting rule-based,
jurisprudential, and administrative considerations ahead of merits-oriented
considerations in some cases. But it could also be partly a symptom of the
relative isolation in which the Justices make their case selection decisions.
This isolation may make it more difficult for the Justices to calculate the
strategic implications of voting for or against certain cases, even if those
considerations continue to drive many of their decisions. It is also possible
that at least some of the Justices were voting to grant or deny certain cases
for reasons that are not directly ideological or strategic-such as interest (or
lack of interest) in a particular subject area-but that are not necessarily
inconsistent with a merits-oriented approach to case selection.
3. Ideologically Aligned and Ideologically Opposed Pairs
Two patterns stand out in the voting alignments data; the ordinal
rankings of the Justices remain fairly constant on both the merits and on
certiorari, but the Justices' agreement rates tend to be lower on certiorari than
they are on the merits. These patterns suggest that merits-oriented concerns
play a substantial role in the Justices' case selection decisions, but that other
factors affect their decisionmaking as well. To better understand what these
other factors are, we compared the voting behavior of ideologically aligned
obtained for other liberal pairs: Justices Brennan and Blackmun (77.2% to 54.7%), and
Justices Marshall and Blackmun (76.8% to 56.4%). Id.
73 See id. With respect to Justice Blackmun's voting behavior, see supra notes 56
and 66-67 and accompanying text.
74 The merits agreement rate for Justices Thomas and Blackmun was 44.4%,
whereas their certiorari agreement rate was 57.5%. See Appendix B. The merits
agreement rate for Justices Thomas and Stevens was 42.3%, whereas their certiorari
agreement rate was 56.2%. Id.
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Justices to that of ideologically opposed Justices.
We found that the decline in agreement rates from the merits to certiorari
was markedly larger for Justices who were closely aligned at the merits stage
than it was for those who were frequently opposed on the merits. Of the
eleven pairings of Justices with an agreement rate on the merits of 80% or
more, all had a lower rate of agreement on certiorari than on the merits.75
Moreover, the drop was pronounced; the agreement rate for all of the pairs
fell by more than 10% from the merits to certiorari, and for six of the eleven
it sank by more than 20%.76 Expanding the closely aligned group to include
all pairings with a merits agreement rate of over 75% yielded similar results,
but the decline in the certiorari agreement rate was less dramatic. All but one
of these twenty-three pairs agreed more often in voting on the merits than
they did on certiorari; 77 the agreement rate for seventeen of these pairs fell
more than 10% from the merits to certiorari; and the agreement rate for eight
of them sank more than 20%.78
At the other end of the spectrum, however, the record was much more
mixed. For example, of the twenty pairings of Justices with an agreement
rate on the merits of 55% or less, thirteen of them agreed more often in
voting on the merits, but seven of them agreed more often in voting on
certiorari. 79 Even for those pairs who agreed more often on the merits, the
drop in agreement rate from merits to certiorari was much more modest than
it was for the closely-aligned group; the agreement rate for only four pairs of
ideologically opposed Justices fell by more than 10%, and none dropped by
as much as 20%.8o
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See id The lone exception was Justices Souter and Ginsburg. Their merits
agreement rate was 77.0%, whereas their certiorari agreement rate was 79.3%. Id. As
noted earlier, our data on Justice Ginsburg was limited to her first term, which may
explain this aberration. See supra Part IV.A.2.
78 See Appendix B.
79 See id. The seven pairs of Justices who voted together more often on certiorari
than on the merits were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun, Justices Thomas
and Ginsburg, Justices Blackmun and Scalia, Justices Stevens and Scalia, Justices
Marshall and Scalia, Justices Blackmun and Thomas, and Justices Stevens and Thomas.
See id.
80 Three of the pairs included Justice Brennan. In his pairing with Chief Justice
Burger, the agreement rate on the merits was 53.9%, and on certiorari it was 36.3%; with
Justice Kennedy the agreement rate on the merits was 53.7%, and on certiorari it was
41.1%; with Justice O'Connor the agreement rate on the merits was 53.2%, and on
certiorari it was 41.9%. Id. The fourth pair was Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Stevens, who had an agreement rate on the merits of 53.0% and on certiorari of 41.0%.
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The data thus shows that the Justices generally agree less frequently on
certiorari than they do on the merits, but the decline in their agreement rates
is markedly larger for Justices who are ideologically aligned on the merits
than it is for Justices who are ideologically opposed on the merits.81 These
results present something of a puzzle, on which we offer some thoughts.
The fact that both ideologically aligned and opposed Justices tended to
agree less often on certiorari than on the merits suggests that there is a more
complex constellation of factors involved at the certiorari stage, and this
complexity fosters greater disagreement, regardless of whether the Justices
tend to agree or disagree on the merits. The array of pertinent factors on
certiorari includes not only merits-oriented concerns, but also subjective
judgments about the size of the docket, the existence of a conflict in the
lower courts, the breadth and importance of the issue, the Court's
institutional responsibility to hear certain types of cases, and so forth.82 The
Justices' greater level of disagreement on certiorari indicates that these other
considerations carry weight in their decisionmaking, and that they exert a
kind of randomizing influence on the Justices' voting behavior.
But how to explain the much more pronounced decline in the agreement
rates among ideologically aligned Justices? One possibility is that the decline
in agreement rates on certiorari is due (in whole or in part) to the atomistic
nature of the Justices' certiorari process. 83 The relative isolation in which the
Justices make their case selection decisions may make it more difficult even
for Justices who are voting with a view to the merits to agree with their like-
minded counterparts. Because the Justices make their case selection
decisions with little, if any, collective deliberation, the process itself tends to
impede Justices from signaling one another or voting together (as opposed to
the merits stage, where they participate together in oral argument and
deliberate in a more collegial way).
Another possible explanation is that jurisprudential, rule-based, and
administrative factors are trumping merits-oriented concerns to some degree,
and this effect is more obvious among the ideologically aligned Justices. One
would expect that, if ideological and strategic considerations were
81 Among pairs of Justices who agreed on the merits more than 80% of the time, the
certiorari agreement rate dropped by an average of 18.4%. See id. Among pairs of
Justices who agreed on the merits more than 75% of the time, the certiorari agreement
rate dropped by an average of 14.5%. See id Among pairs of Justices who agreed on the
merits less than 55% of the time, the certiorari agreement rate dropped by an average of
2.9% (this figure includes the seven pairs who had higher agreement rates on certiorari
than on the merits). See id.
82 See supra Part III.A. (discussing rule-based, administrative, and jurisprudential
considerations).
83 See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of collegial
deliberation in the certiorari process).
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eliminated, the effect would be to moderate the range of disagreement among
the Justices and cause their agreement rates to bunch closer together. In other
words, Justices who were ideologically aligned on the merits would be
aligned to a lesser degree on certiorari, and Justices who were ideologically
opposed on the merits would agree more often on certiorari. The greater
unpredictability on certiorari (stemming from the broad array of factors and
the relative isolation in which the Justices make their decisions), however,
would tend to depress the agreement rates of all Justices, whether
ideologically aligned or opposed. If both of these effects are operating, then
in combination they would tend to cause the agreement rates of ideologically
aligned Justices to fall markedly on certiorari. But the effects would tend to
counteract each other with respect to ideologically opposed Justices, leading
their agreement rates to drop less dramatically or even, in some cases, to rise.
On an intuitive level, this explanation makes some sense. Each term, a
certain percentage of the cases are granted unanimously.84 To the extent that
the Justices are voting to grant these cases because they believe that the
Court has an institutional responsibility to hear them (regardless of what the
ultimate outcome might be), then the certiorari agreement rate between
ideologically opposed Justices will rise (because of factors unrelated to the
merits) but the certiorari agreement rate between ideologically aligned
Justices will not (because they would likely have voted together in such cases
anyway). Thus, if Justices are voting for unanimous grants for institutional
reasons, and not merely because they all want to reverse the lower court, then
the disparity between the agreement rates of ideologically opposed Justices
on certiorari and the merits should be more muted than the disparity between
ideologically aligned Justices. This analysis depends, of course, on the nature
of cases which are granted unanimously. We now turn to a closer
examination of such cases.
B. Cases Granted Unanimously and by a Minority Vote
Yet another way to approach the question of how significantly merits-
oriented considerations influence the Justices' decisionmaking on certiorari
is to analyze the Justices' voting behavior in cases granted at the two
extremes-that is, those granted unanimously and those granted by a bare
minority of four votes.8 5 The existence of unanimous grants in cases that are
divisive on the merits, and the existence of minority grants in cases where
84 See infra note 86 (giving the specific numbers for each term in our five-term
sample).
85 Although cases in these two categories are not different in kind from cases
granted with five, six, seven, or eight votes, they are especially revealing because they are
at the two poles.
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there is full agreement on the merits, are strong evidence that rule-based and
jurisprudential factors act as a moderating influence on ideological and
strategic impulses at the case selection stage.
In our sample, the Court generally granted approximately 15-25% of the
cases with a unanimous vote.86 When a case is granted unanimously, there
are two possibilities. One is that, at the certiorari stage, the Justices were in
agreement about the merits and thus all voted to grant the case because they
(presumably) wanted to reverse the result on the merits and eliminate a faulty
or otherwise undesirable precedent. This possibility is consistent with a
merits-oriented view of decisionmaking on certiorari. If it is correct, then one
would expect to find that unanimous grants typically lead to unanimous
decisions on the merits.
The second possibility is that the case was granted unanimously because
the Justices agreed that the Court, as a matter of institutional responsibility,
needed to take the case. Under this view, the Justices' jurisprudential
concerns override their merits-oriented concerns. If this possibility is correct,
then one would likely find that some cases granted unanimously result in
deeply divided decisions on the merits.
Similar possibilities exist at the other end of the spectrum. In our sample,
the Court granted about 25-35% of the cases with only the bare four votes
required.87 One possibility is that, at the certiorari stage, the Justices were
deeply divided about the merits, and this division is reflected in their case
selection votes. If this possibility, which is consistent with a merits-oriented
view of decisionmaking on certiorari, is correct, then one would expect to
find that minority grants typically lead to closely divided decisions on the
merits. The second possibility is that the case received only a minimum
number of votes to grant because the Justices disagreed not about the merits,
but rather about whether the case was important enough to deserve plenary
review. Under this scenario, the Justices who voted to deny review would
have done so for rule-based, jurisprudential, or administrative reasons rather
than for ideological or strategic reasons. If this possibility is correct, then one
86 There was one marked exception to this in our sample of five terms (1993, 1992,
1991, 1988, and 1984). In 1984, only 6% of the cases were granted by a unanimous vote.
See Appendix D (setting out the data on cases granted unanimously and by minority).
The specific numbers for each term are: 1993: 23 of 84 (27%); 1992: 23 of 85 (27%);
1991: 18 of 105 (17%); 1988: 16 of 119 (13%); 1984:9 of 146 (6%). Id. We included in
our data set only cases in which the Court heard oral argument and issued a decision on
the merits.
87 The Justices use the "Rule of Four" on certiorari, such that four votes suffice to
grant review. See Revesz & Karlan, supra note 7, at 1068-73 (describing the origins of
the Rule of Four). The specific number of minority grants for each of the sample terms
are as follows: 1993: 21 of 84 (25%); 1992: 20 of 85 (24%); 1991: 32 of 105 (31%);
1988: 32 of 119 (27%); 1984: 52 of 146 (36%). See Appendix D.
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should find that a number of minority grants ultimately result in unanimous
decisions on the merits.
To gain a better sense of the nature of unanimous grants and minority
grants with respect to these issues, we segregated those cases for five terms:
1984, 1988, 1991, 1992, and 1993. We then tracked the outcome on the
merits in each of those cases. 88
In cases granted unanimously, we found that in over 25% of the
decisions on the merits the Court was divided five to four, a considerably
higher percentage than the Court had in the full set of cases granted. 89 In
these cases, almost half of the Justices were apparently voting to grant even
though they knew that they were likely to lose on the merits. It is possible
that some of these Justices simply miscalculated which way the Court would
decide, but given their familiarity with each other, it is highly unlikely that
all four of the losing Justices erred in this way in such a significant number
of cases.90 This voting behavior indicates that the Justices have a strong
sense of the Court's institutional responsibility to hear certain cases, and that
this sense can and frequently does trump merits-oriented considerations. 91
In cases granted by a minority of Justices, the results were even more
striking. The Court's decisions on the merits were unanimous in over one-
third of the cases that were granted with only four votes. 92 In these cases,
88 In selecting the five terms sampled, we chose the three most recent terms plus two
terms from the 1980s. We opted for 1988 and 1984 because the Court's personnel was
stable both in those terms and the terms immediately succeeding them. When analyzing
the outcome on the merits, we included in the majority any Justice who concurred in the
opinion or in the judgment. We treated any Justice who dissented, whether in whole or in
part, as being in the dissent.
89 The average based on the total number of cases granted unanimously and then
decided 5-4 on the merits in each of the five terms surveyed was 26% (when averaging
the per-term averages it was 25%). See Appendix D. The numbers for each term were:
1993: 8 of 23; 1992: 2 of 23; 1991: 5 of 18; 1988: 7 of 16; 1984: 1 of 9. Id. Several cases
in our sample were granted unanimously by an 8-0 vote. The average based on all cases
granted and then decided by a one-vote margin in the five terms surveyed was 18.3%. See
EPSTEIN ET AL., COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, at 223-24 tbl.3-4.
90 The rate of affirmances in these cases was consistent with the norm. In the five
terms surveyed, the overall rate of affirmances was 43.1%, see EPSTEIN ET AL.,
COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, at 228-29 tbl.3-6, and in this subset of cases it was 43.5%,
see Appendix D.
91 Whether these cases also tend to be the high-profile, politically sensitive cases
that dominate the American public's image of the Supreme Court is an interesting
question that we plan to pursue in another article.
92 The average based on the total number of cases granted by a minority and then
decided unanimously in each of the sample terms was 38% (the average of the per-term
averages was 39%). See Appendix D. The numbers for each term were: 1993: 5 of 21;
1992: 12 of 20; 1991: 13 of 32; 1988: 10 of 32; 1984: 20 of 52 (in 1984, one or more
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over half of the Justices were apparently voting to deny even though they
could reasonably expect to win on the merits. Again, it is possible that some
of these Justices simply misjudged how the Court would decide, but that
possibility alone cannot account for the Justices' voting behavior in such a
significant number of cases. 93 Rather, it seems that the Justices who opposed
review in these cases did so for reasons unrelated to the merits, such as rule-
based, jurisprudential, and administrative concerns about the quality of the
cases and the size of the docket. 94
V. CONCLUSION
With the ability to select its own cases, the Supreme Court quietly
exercises great power: "[a]genda setting accounts for the direction of
constitutional law, just as the opinions themselves account for its
substance." 95 How the Justices perform this critical task remains something
of a mystery, given the secrecy that envelops their decisions over whether to
grant or deny review in the thousands of cases that come before them each
term.
A persistent question about the Justices' use of the certiorari power is
whether (and to what extent) they exercise it ideologically and strategically,
with a view to securing their preferred outcome on the merits. By comparing
the Justices' voting alignments on certiorari to their voting alignments on the
merits in granted cases, we saw strong evidence that there is a significant
merits-oriented component in the Justices' decisionmaking on certiorari.
However, the substantial divergence between the Justices' voting patterns on
certiorari and their voting patterns on the merits refutes the notion that a
Justice's vote on certiorari is nothing more than a preliminary vote on the
Justices did not participate in the decision on the merits in nine of the cases decided
unanimously-usually Justice Powell, who had health problems). Id. The average based
on all cases granted and then decided unanimously in the five terms surveyed was 42.7%.
See EPSTEIN ET AL., COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, at 210 tbl.3-1.
93 Of interest, in our sample the number of cases granted with a minority of votes
diminished over time, while the number of cases granted unanimously grew. See
Appendix D. In 1984, the Court granted fifty-two cases with four votes and only nine
cases unanimously. Id. In 1993, in contrast, the Court granted twenty-one cases with four
votes and twenty-three unanimously (despite taking just over half as many cases as it did
in 1984). Id. Changes in personnel almost certainly account for this substantial shift in the
Justices' voting behavior.
94 The rate of affirmances in these cases was lower than the norm, but only slightly.
In the five terms that we surveyed, the overall rate of affirmances was 43.1%, see
EPSTEIN ET AL., COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, at 228-29 tbl.3-6, but in this subset of cases
it was 41.7%. See Appendix D.
95 Friedman, supra note 49, at 294.
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merits. This conclusion is underscored by the Justices' voting behavior in
cases that are granted unanimously and those granted with only four votes. In
both sets of cases, the vote on certiorari was not, as a general matter, a mere
precursor to the vote on the merits. Rather, in cases granted unanimously the
Court was often deeply divided on the merits, indicating that many of the
Justices cast their vote to grant the case not on the basis of merits-oriented
considerations, but on the basis of jurisprudential concerns. Similarly, the
Court resolved many of the cases granted with only four votes by a
unanimous decision on the merits, suggesting that the Justices who voted to
deny the case did so for rule-based or administrative reasons having to do
with the importance of the case, rather than for outcome-oriented reasons.
While it is not possible to quantify with precision the impact of these
different considerations in the certiorari process, this new data on the
Justices' voting alignments at the certiorari and merits stages provides a fresh
perspective on the issue.
CERTIORARI AND THE MERITS
Appendix A
October Term 1993




Cert x 66.3 51.1 68.5 75.0 77.2 65.2 76.1 53.3
Merits 55.3 49.4 76.7 73.6 73.6 64.4 67.8 66.7
Blackmun
Cert 66.3 x 67.4 60.9 56.5 65.2 75.0 64.1 71.7
Merits 55.3 77.6 52.4 48.2 55.3 81.2 40.0 68.2
Stevens
Cert 51.1 67.4 x 65.2 52.2 52.2 72.8 57.6 69.6
Merits 49.4 77.6 58.1 48.3 58.6 77.0 40.2 75.9
O'Connor
Cert 68.5 60.9 65.2 x 67.4 73.9 68.5 64.1 65.2
Merits 76.7 52.4 58.1 69.8 68.6 65.1 62.8 69.8
Scalia
Cert 75.0 56.5 52.2 67.4 x 78.3 68.5 77.2 65.2
Merits 73.6 48.2 48.3 69.8 75.9 57.5 82.8 62.1
Kennedy
Cert 77.2 65.2 52.2 73.9 78.3 x 64.1 72.8 58.7
Merits 73.6 55.3 58.6 68.6 75.9 67.8 72.4 64.4
Souter
Cert 65.2 75.0 72.8 68.5 68.5 64.1 x 60.9 79.3
Merits 64.4 81.2 77.0 65.1 57.5 67.8 46.0 77.0
Thomas
Cert 76.1 64.1 57.6 64.1 77.2 72.8 60.9 x 57.6
Merits 67.8 40.0 40.2 62.8 82.8 72.4 46.0 52.9
Ginsburg
Cert 53.3 71.7 69.6 65.2 65.2 58.7 79.3 57.6 x
Merits 66.7 68.2 75.9 69.8 62.1 64.4 77.0 52.9
a Merits agreement rate is from The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-The Statistics, 108
HARv. L. REv. 372, 373 (1994).
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October Term 1992
Rate of Agreement in Votes on Certiorari and the
Meritsb
c~ - 0
> 0 Ed F
Rehnquist
Cert X 72.7 56.4 49.5 73.7 63.6 62.6 64.6 68.7
Merits 78.9 54.4 50.0 76.3 78.1 85.1 70.2 82.5
White
Cert 72.7 x 71.7 66.7 80.8 52.5 53.5 69.7 69.7
Merits 78.9 64.0 57.9 67.5 67.5 74.6 72.8 68.4
Blackmun
Cert 56.4 71.7 x 72.7 72.7 54.5 57.6 61.6 55.6
Merits 54.4 64.0 73.7 61.4 47.4 59.6 62.3 50.9
Stevens
Cert 49.5 66.7 72.7 x 56.4 55.6 64.6 60.6 64.6
Merits 50.0 57.9 73.7 54.4 47.4 55.3 57.9 45.6
O'Connor
Cert 73.7 80.8 72.7 56.4 x 51.5 58.6 70.7 58.6
Merits 76.3 67.5 61.4 54.4 69.3 72.8 70.2 73.7
Scalia
Cert 63.6 52.5 54.5 55.6 51.5 x 72.7 64.6 70.7
Merits 78.1 67.5 47.4 47.4 69.3 81.6 73.7 86.0
Kennedy
Cert 62.6 53.5 57.6 64.6 58.6 72.7 x 69.7 73.7
Merits 85.1 74.6 59.6 55.3 72.8 81.6 74.6 83.3
Souter
Cert 64.6 69.7 61.6 60.6 70.7 64.6 69.7 x 65.7
Merits 70.2 72.8 62.3 57.9 70.2 73.7 74.6 67.5
Thomas
Cert 68.7 69.7 55.6 64.6 58.6 70.7 73.7 65.7 x
Merits 82.5 68.4 50.9 45.6 73.7 86.0 83.3 67.5
b Merits agreement rate is from The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-The Statistics, 107
HARv. L. REv. 372, 373 (1993).
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October Term 1991
Rate of Agreement in Votes on Certiorari and the
Meritsc
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Rehnquist 61.8 56.4 37.3 64.5 70.0 62.7 56.4 60.0
Cert x
Merits 71.9 48.2 42.1 63.2 70.2 66.7 68.1 80.0
White
Cert 61.8 x 74.5 59.1 71.8 51.8 55.5 54.5 70.9
Merits 71.9 57.9 58.8 64.0 60.5 67.5 69.9 67.1
Blackmun
Cert 56.4 74.5 x 68.2 68.2 48.2 55.5 63.6 52.7
Merits 48.2 57.9 73.7 60.5 31.6 54.4 56.6 42.4
Stevens
Cert 37.3 59.1 68.2 x 56.4 43.6 56.4 59.1 46.4
Merits 42.1 58.8 73.7 59.6 35.1 51.8 58.4 41.2
O'Connor
Cert 64.5 71.8 68.2 56.4 X 50.9 60.0 57.3 62.7
Merits 63.2 64.0 60.5 59.6 53.5 63.2 67.3 60.0
Scalia
Cert 70.0 51.8 48.2 43.6 50.9 x 67.3 62.7 62.7
Merits 70.2 60.5 31.6 35.1 53.5 62.3 61.1 85.9
Kennedy 5.Cert 62.7 55.5 56.4 60.0 67.3 x 68.2 59.1
Merits 66.7 67.5 54.4 51.8 63.2 62.3 74.3 60.0
Souter
Cert 56.4 54.5 63.6 59.1 57.3 62.7 68.2 x 56.4
Merits 68.1 69.9 56.6 58.4 67.3 61.1 74.3 66.7
Thomas
Cert 60.0 70.9 52.7 46.4 62.7 62.7 59.1 56.4 X
Merits 80.0 67.1 42.4 41.2 60.0 85.9 60.0 66.7
c Merits agreement rate is from The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-The Statistics, 106
HARv. L. REv. 378, 379 (1992).
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October Term 1990
Rate of Agreement in Votes on Certiorari and the
Meritsd
C ~ -~> 0
Rehnquist
Cert x 68.2 44.2 65.1 35.7 71.3 65.1 72.1 64.3
Merits 79.2 48.3 52.5 49.2 80.0 73.1 82.1 81.5
White
Cert 68.2 x 65.1 70.5 48.8 70.5 56.6 63.6 52.7
Merits 79.2 60.0 64.2 59.2 71.7 62.2 70.1 77.8
Marshall
Cert 44.2 65.1 x 69.8 60.5 52.7 49.6 51.9 48.8
Merits 48.3 60.0 81.7 78.3 53.3 44.5 51.3 54.6
Blackmun
Cert 65.1 70.5 69.8 x 53.5 65.9 55.0 58.9 51.2
Merits 52.5 64.2 81.7 72.5 60.0 49.6 54.7 59.3
Stevens
Cert 35.7 48.8 60.5 53.5 x 48.8 47.3 45.0 49.6
Merits 49.2 59.2 78.3 72.5 54.2 41.2 52.1 55.6
O'Connor
Cert 71.3 70.5 52.7 65.9 48.8 x 59.7 66.7 57.7
Merits 80.0 71.7 53.3 60.0 54.2 68.9 84.6 88.9
Scalia
Cert 65.1 56.6 49.6 55.0 47.3 59.7 X 77.5 60.5
Merits 73.1 62.2 44.5 49.6 41.2 68.9 72.4 71.0
Kennedy
Cert 72.1 63.6 51.9 58.9 45.0 66.7 77.5 x 61.2
Merits 82.1 70.1 51.3 54.7 52.1 84.6 72.4 83.8
Souter
Cert 64.3 52.7 48.8 51.2 49.6 57.7 60.5 61.2 x
Merits 81.5 77.8 54.6 59.3 55.6 88.9 71.0 83.8
d Merits agreement rate is from The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-The Statistics, 105
HARv. L. REv. 419, 420 (1991).
[Vol. 69:1
CERTIORARI AND THE MERITS
October Term 1989
Rate of Agreement in Votes on Certiorari and the
Meritse
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Rehnquist
Cert x 42.5 70.8 45.8 63.3 31.7 64.2 65.8 73.3
Merits 38.1 82.0 37.4 54.7 48.2 81.9 81.3 82.6
Brennan
Cert 42.5 x 46.7 83.3 49.2 55.8 41.7 48.3 39.2
Merits 38.1 46.0 94.2 73.4 65.5 42.0 38.1 44.2
White
Cert 70.8 46.7 x 48.3 69.2 45.8 68.3 60.0 65.8
Merits 82.0 46.0 46.0 61.9 53.2 74.6 70.5 73.9
Marshall
Cert 45.8 83.3 48.3 x 50.8 59.2 43.3 45.0 44.2
Merits 37.4 94.2 46.0 69.8 64.0 39.1 37.4 41.3
Blackmun
Cert 63.3 49.2 69.2 50.8 x 51.7 62.5 55.8 60.0
Merits 54.7 73.4 61.9 69.8 61.2 56.5 49.6 55.8
StevensCert 31.7 55.8 45.8 59.2 51.7 X 54.2 52.5 43.3
Merits 48.2 65.5 53.2 64.0 61,2 47.1 45.3 46.4
O'Connor
Cert 64.2 41.7 68.3 43.3 62.5 54.2 x 68.3 67.5
Merits 81.9 42.0 74.6 39.1 56.5 47.1 79.7 83.2
Scalia
Cert 65.8 48.3 60.0 45.0 55.8 52.5 68.3 x 70.8
Merits 81.3 38.1 70.5 37.4 49.6 45.3 79.7 84.1
Kennedy
Cert 73.3 39.2 65.8 44.2 60.0 43.3 67.5 70.8 x
Merits 82.6 44.2 73.9 41.3 55.8 46.4 83.2 84.1
e Merits agreement rate is from The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-The Statistics, 104
HARV. L. REV. 359, 360 (1990).
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October Term 1988




Cert x 43.6 78.9 48.1 57.9 41.4 80.5 72.2 77.4
Merits 50.7 88.0 49.6 54.9 63.6 93.4 82.3 92.1
Brennan
Cert 43.6 x 43.6 80.5 58.6 60.2 43.6 41.4 43.6
Merits 50.7 53.9 93.6 78.0 72.7 53.7 53.6 54.0
White
Cert 78.9 43.6 X 51.1 62.4 48.9 72.9 70.7 71.4
Merits 88.0 53.9 50.7 58.0 61.7 81.2 78.2 85.8
Marshall
Cert 48.1 80.5 51.1 x 57.1 61.7 51.1 47.4 49.6
Merits 49.6 93.6 50.7 76.1 73.6 49.6 50.4 50.7
Blackmun
Cert 57.9 58.6 62.4 57.1 x 60.9 57.9 57.1 56.4
Merits 54.9 78.0 58.0 76.1 73.8 56.8 53.5 56.7
Stevens
Cert 41.4 60.2 48.9 61.7 60.9 x 42.9 51.1 44.4
Merits 63.6 72.7 61.7 73.6 73.8 63.5 59.3 63.3
O'Connor
Cert 80.5 43.6 72.9 51.1 57.9 42.9 x 66.2 74.4
Merits 93.4 53.7 81.2 49.6 56.8 63.5 75.9 89.7
Scalia
Cert 72.2 41.4 70.7 47.4 57.1 51.1 66.2 x 79.7
Merits 82.3 53.6 78.2 50.4 53.5 59.3 75.9 85.0
Kennedy
Cert 77.4 43.6 71.4 49.6 56.4 44.4 74.4 79.7 x
Merits 92.1 54.0 85.8 50.7 56.7 63.3 89.7 85.0
fMerits agreement rate is from The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-The Statistics, 103
HARV. L. REv. 394, 395 (1989).
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CERTIORARI AND THE MERITS
October Term 1987
Rate of Agreement in Votes on Certiorari and the
Meritsg
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Rehnquist
Cert x 44.5 67.7 52.3 52.3 40.0 71.6 60.0 49.7
Merits 60.9 81.3 57.6 68.3 71.2 81.9 82.6 83.1
Brennan
Cert 44.5 x 51.0 80.6 56.1 60.6 41.9 47.1 40.6
Merits 60.9 64.7 94.2 79.9 74.1 57.2 56.5 63.1
White
Cert 67.7 51.0 x 51.0 63.9 43.9 71.6 58.7 40.6
Merits 81.3 64.7 62.1 67.9 74.3 76.3 72.5 82.8
Marshall
Cert 52.3 80.6 51.0 X 57.4 58.1 44.5 47.1 43.2
Merits 57.6 94.2 62.1 77.9 74.3 54.7 52.2 61.5
Blackmun
Cert 52.3 56.1 63.9 57.4 X 63.2 58.7 57.4 43.2
Merits 68.3 79.9 67.9 77.9 72.9 61.9 60.9 67.2
Stevens
Cert 40.0 60.6 43.9 58.1 63.2 x 43.9 46.5 51.6
Merits 71.2 74.1 74.3 74.3 72.9 66.9 63.8 67.7
O'Connor
Cert 71.6 41.9 71.6 44.5 58.7 43.9 x 65.2 52.3
Merits 81.9 57.2 76.3 54.7 61.9 66.9 78.1 82.5
Scalia
Cert 60.0 47.1 58.7 47.1 57.4 46.5 65.2 x 58.7
Merits 82.6 56.5 72.5 52.2 60.9 63.8 78.1 83.1
Kennedy
Cert 49.7 40.6 40.6 43.2 43.2 51.6 52.3 58.7 x
Merits 83.1 63.1 82.8 61.5 67.2 67.7 82.5 83.1
g Merits agreement rate is from The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-The Statistics, 102
HARV. L. REV. 350, 351 (1988).
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October Term 1986
Rate of Agreement in Votes on Certiorari and the
Meritsh
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2 U
Rehnquist
Cert X 43.6 76.9 40.4 55.1 68.6 39.1 76.3 58.3
Merits 40.8 84.8 39.5 53.7 86.1 47.7 86.1 85.8
Brennan
Cert 43.6 x 50.0 80.1 57.7 49.4 59.6 42.9 45.5
Merits 40.8 47.0 98.0 78.5 56.3 67.5 45.0 41.9
White
Cert 76.9 50.0 x 44.2 55.1 69.9 44.2 73.6 55.8
Merits 84.8 47.0 45.7 61.5 77.3 58.0 72.7 78.2
Marshall
Cert 40.4 80.1 44.2 x 57.1 37.2 59.0 44.9 43.6
Merits 39.5 98.0 45.7 79.9 55.0 68.2 43.0 40.5
Blackmun
Cert 55.1 57.7 55.1 57.1 x 53.2 64.7 57.1 48.1
Merits 53.7 78.5 61.5 79.9 68.9 70.9 57.7 52.4
Powell
Cert 68.6 49.4 69.9 37.2 53.2 x 47.4 66.7 50.0
Merits 86.1 56.3 77.3 55.0 68.9 56.7 83.3 73.5
Stevens
Cert 39.1 59.6 44.2 59.0 64.7 47.4 x 44.9 43.6
Merits 47.7 67.5 58.0 68.2 70.9 56.7 52.0 51.0
O'Connor
Cert 76.3 42.9 73.6 44.9 57.1 66.7 44.9 x 60.3
Merits 86.1 45.0 72.7 43.0 57.7 83.3 52.0 74.1
Scalia
Cert 58.3 45.5 55.8 43.6 48.1 50.0 43.6 60.3 x
Merits 85.8 41.9 78.2 40.5 52.4 73.5 51.0 74.1
h Merits agreement rate is from The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-The Statistics, 101
HARV. L. REv. 362, 363 (1987).
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October Term 1985




Cert x 36.6 62.9 45.1 53.7 68.6 77.7 39.4 75.4
Merits 46.5 78.5 40.8 50.0 84.5 91.7 48.4 82.2
Brennan
Cert 36.6 x 52.0 82.3 61.1 53.1 39.4 65.1 41.7
Merits 46.5 54.8 91.0 80.3 55.8 43.9 67.9 56.8
White
Cert 62.9 52.0 x 51.4 65.7 61.1 71.7 46.9 73.7
Merits 78.5 54.8 48.1 54.8 73.7 77.6 56.7 79.5
Marshall
Cert 45.1 82.3 51.4 x 58.3 54.9 40.0 64.6 40.0
Merits 40.8 91.0 48.1 82.1 51.6 39.4 67.1 54.2
Blackmun
Cert 53.7 61.1 65.7 58.3 x 64.6 55.4 58.3 61.1
Merits 50.0 80.3 54.8 82.1 58.4 46.8 64.1 59.6
Powell
Cert 68.6 53.1 61.1 54.9 64.6 x 63.4 49.1 71.4
Merits 84.5 55.8 73.7 51.6 58.4 87.7 56.1 87.1
Rehnquist
Cert 77.7 39.4 71.7 40.0 55.4 63.4 x 37.7 77.1
Merits 91.7 43.9 77.6 39.4 46.8 87.7 49.7 84.5
Stevens
Cert 39.4 65.1 46.9 64.6 58.3 49.1 37.7 x 44.6
Merits 48.4 67.9 56.7 67.1 64.1 56.1 49.7 58.1
O'Connor
Cert 75.4 41.7 73.7 40.0 61.1 71.4 77.1 44.6 x
Merits 82.2 56.8 79.5 54.2 59.6 87.1 84.5 58.1
i Merits agreement rate is from The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-The Statistics, 100
HARV. L. REV. 304,305 (1986).
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October Term 1984
Rate of Agreement in Votes on Certiorari and the
Meritsi
0
Burger 34.3 56.0 40.0 50.3 50.9 62.9 46.3 62.3
Cert
Merits 55.3 85.9 51.7 72.5 80.8 89.3 60.1 88.6
Brennan
Cert 34.3 x 44.0 77.1 46.3 41.1 30.3 62.9 38.9
Merits 55.3 61.3 100.0 79.2 65.7 52.0 69.1 61.3
White
Cert 56.0 44.0 45.1 61.1 53.7 62.3 49.1 65.1X
Merits 85.9 61.3 57.9 77.0 79.8 81.8 63.5 82.4
Marshall
Cert 40.0 77.1 45.1 x 46.3 44.6 29.1 64.0 42.3
Merits 51.7 100.0 57.9 75.0 62.7 47.6 65.3 59.3
Blackmun
Cert 50.3 46.3 61.1 46.3 x 58.3 57.7 47.4 55.4
Merits 72.5 79.2 77.0 75.0 79.6 70.3 66.7 80.4
Powell
Cert 50.9 41.1 53.7 44.6 58.3 x 56.0 46.7 56.1
Merits 80.8 65.7 79.8 62.7 79.6 76.2 63.1 85.7
Rehnquist
Cert 62.9 30.3 62.3 29.1 57.7 56.0 x 44.6 68.6
Merits 89.3 52.0 81.8 47.6 70.3 76.2 60.1 90.5
Stevens
Cert 46.3 62.9 49.1 64.0 47.4 46.7 44.6 x 49.7
Merits 60.1 69.1 63.5 65.3 66.7 63.1 60.1 63.3
O'Connor
Cert 62.3 38.9 65.1 42.3 55.4 56.1 68.6 49.7 x
Merits 88.6 61.3 82.4 59.3 80.4 85.7 90.5 63.3
Merits agreement rate is from The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-The Statistics, 99
HARV. L. REV. 322, 323 (1985).
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October Term 1983
Rate of Agreement in Votes on Certiorari and the
Meritsk
,-, o 0 > 0
Burger
Cert x 38.0 51.1 42.3 46.0 54.7 62.8 52.6 60.6
Merits 60.0 87.5 55.8 77.8 89.4 87.5 55.9 91.9
Brennan
Cert 38.0 x 54.7 81.0 54.0 55.5 40.1 57.7 42.3
Merits 60.0 62.3 94.2 70.9 58.5 49.7 75.0 56.6
White
Cert 51.1 54.7 x 51.8 65.7 71.5 66.4 47.4 67.2
Merits 87.5 62.3 61.2 77.8 81.0 81.1 61.0 84.5
Marshall
Cert 42.3 81.0 51.8 x 54.0 52.6 38.7 63.5 38.0
Merits 55.8 94.2 61.2 71.7 58.8 45.5 67.5 51.3
Blackmun
Cert 46.0 54.0 65.7 54.0 x 66.4 62.8 51.1 59.1
Merits 77.8 70.9 77.8 71.7 78.3 68.9 66.3 75.2
Powell
Cert 54.7 55.5 71.5 52.6 66.4 x 64.2 54.0 62.0
Merits 89.4 58.5 81.0 58.8 78.3 82.4 55.6 84.9
Rehnquist
Cert 62.8 40.1 66.4 38.7 62.8 64.2 x 43.1 75.9
Merits 87.5 49.7 81.1 45.5 68.9 82.4 51.6 91.9
Stevens
Cert 52.6 57.7 47.4 63.5 51.1 54.0 43.1 x 45.3
Merits 55.9 75.0 61.0 67.5 66.3 55.6 51.6 58.5
O'Connor
Cert 60.6 42.3 67.2 38.0 59.1 62.0 75.9 45.3 x
Merits 91.9 56.6 84.5 51.3 75.2 84.9 91.9 58.5
k Merits agreement rate is from The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-The Statistics, 98
HARV. L. REV. 307, 308 (1984).
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Appendix B
Average Rate of Agreement in Votes on the Merits* and
Certiorari
Pairing Merits Ordinal Cert Ordinal
Average Ranking Average Ranking
Brennan + Marshall 95.0% 1 80.7% 1
Burger + Rehnquist 89.5% 2 67.8% 14
Burger + O'Connor 87.6% 3 66.1% 16
Powell + O'Connor 85.3% 4 63.9% 24
Scalia + Thomas 84.9% 5 70.2% 8
Burger + Powell 84.9% 6 58.1% 42
Burger + White 84.0% 7 56.7% 47
Rehnquist + Powell 83.1% 8 63.1% 26
Rehnquist + O'Connor 82.4% 9 72.0% 4
Rehnquist + Kennedy 80.8% 10 67.9% 13
Rehnquist + White 80.7% 11 69.7% 9
Rehnquist + Scalia 78.4% 12 66.3% 15
White + Powell 78.0% 13 64.1% 23
O'Connor + Kennedy 77.8% 14 64.8% 21
Scalia + Kennedy 77.8% 15 72.1% 3
Brennan + Blackmun 77.2% 16 54.7% 50
Souter + Ginsburg 77.0% 17 79.3% 2
Marshall + Blackmun 76.8% 18 56.4% 48
Rehnquist + Thomas 76.8% 18 68.3% 12
* Merits agreement rates are from the Harvard Law Review's statistical recaps of the
Supreme Court terms, which can be found in the first issue of each of Volumes 98-108.
CERTIORARI AND THE MERITS
Average Rate of Agreement in Votes on the Merits* and
Certiorari
Pairing Merits Ordinal Cert Ordinal
Average Ranking Average Ranking
Stevens + Ginsburg 75.9% 20 69.6% 10
White + Kennedy 75.8% 21 58.4% 41
White + O'Connor 75.4% 22 71.6% 6
Kennedy + Souter 75.1% 23 65.8% 18
White + Souter 73.5% 24 59.0% 39
Powell + Scalia 73.5% 25 50.0% 57
O'Connor + Souter 72.9% 26 63.5% 25
Kennedy + Thomas 71.9% 27 68.5% 11
Powell + Blackmun 71.3% 28 60.6% 34
O'Connor + Scalia 71.2% 29 61.2% 32
Rehnquist + Souter 71.1% 30 62.6% 28
Blackmun + Stevens 70.3% 31 59.7% 37
Brennan + Stevens 70.3% 32 60.3% 36
White + Scalia 69.9% 33 58.0% 43
O'Connor + Ginsburg 69.8% 34 65.2% 19
Marshall + Stevens 69.8% 35 61.3% 31
Blackmun + Ginsburg 68.2% 36 71.7% 5
White + Thomas 67.8% 37 70.3% 7
Burger + Blackmun 66.8% 38 50.0% 58
Rehnquist + Ginsburg 66.7% 39 53.3% 52
* Merits agreement rates are from the Harvard Law Review's statistical recaps of the
Supreme Court terms, which can be found in the first issue of each of Volumes 98-108.
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Average Rate of Agreement in Votes on the Merits* and
Certiorari
Pairing Merits Ordinal Cert Ordinal
Average Ranking Average Ranking
Scalia + Souter 65.8% 40 64.1% 22
O'Connor + Thomas 65.5% 41 61.8% 30
Blackmun + Souter 64.9% 42 62.9% 27
White + Blackmun 64.5% 43 66.0% 17
Kennedy + Ginsburg 64.4% 44 58.7% 40
Stevens + Souter 62.2% 45 60.5% 35
Scalia + Ginsburg 62.1% 46 65.2% 20
Blackmun + O'Connor 60.5% 47 61.9% 29
White + Stevens 60.4% 48 50.1% 56
Souter + Thomas 60.1% 49 61.0% 33
Powell + Brennan 59.1% 50 49.8% 59
Powell + Stevens 57.9% 51 49.5% 60
Stevens + O'Connor 57.8% 52 50.3% 55
Blackmun + Kennedy 57.7% 53 56.7% 46
Powell + Marshall 57.0% 54 47.3% 64
Stevens + Kennedy 56.5% 55 51.1% 53
Brennan + White 55.7% 56 48.9% 62
Rehnquist + Blackmun 55.0% 57 59.4% 38
Burger + Stevens 54.8% 58 46.1% 67
Marshall + Souter 54.6% 59 48.8% 63
* Merits agreement rates are from the Harvard Law Review's statistical recaps of the
Supreme Court terms, which can be found in the first issue of each of Volumes 98-108.
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CERTIORARI AND THE MERITS
Average Rate of Agreement in Votes on the Merits* and
Certiorari
Pairing Merits Ordinal Cert Ordinal
Average Ranking Average Ranking
Marshall + White 54.0% 60 51.0% 54
Burger + Brennan 53.9% 61 36.3% 76
Brennan + Kennedy 53.7% 62 41.1% 73
Brennan + O'Connor 53.2% 63 41.9% 72
Rehnquist + Stevens 53.0% 64 41.0% 74
Thomas + Ginsburg 52.9% 65 57.6% 44
Marshall + Kennedy 51.2% 66 47.2% 65
Marshall + O'Connor 50.6% 67 44.6% 69
Burger + Marshall 49.4% 68 42.5% 70
Blackmun + Scalia 49.2% 69 54.1% 51
Stevens + Scalia 48.9% 70 49.1% 61
Rehnquist + Brennan 48.0% 71 40.6% 75
Brennan + Scalia 47.5% 72 45.6% 68
Rehnquist + Marshall 45.6% 73 42.3% 71
Marshall + Scalia 45.0% 74 46.5% 66
Blackmun + Thomas 44.4% 75 57.5% 45
Stevens + Thomas 42.3% 76 56.2% 49
* Merits agreement rates are from the Harvard Law Review's statistical recaps of the
Supreme Court terms, which can be found in the first issue of each of Volumes 98-108.
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Appendix C
Significance of Change in Rate of Agreement
in Votes on the Merits and Certiorari*
Pairing Merits Cert P-Value T-Statistic
Average Average
Brennan + Marshall 95.0% 80.7% <.01 31.65
Burger + Rehnquist 89.5% 67.8% <.01 38.92
Burger + O'Connor 87.6% 66.1% <.01 37.44
Powell + O'Connor 85.3% 63.9% <.01 35.79
Scalia + Thomas 84.9% 70.2% <.01 25.14
Burger + Powell 84.9% 58.1% <.01 43.97
Burger + White 84.0% 56.7% <.01 44.24
Rehnquist + Powell 83.1% 63.1% <.01 32.78
Rehnquist + O'Connor 82.4% 72.0% <.01 17.62
Rehnquist + Kennedy 80.8% 67.9% <.01 20.94
Rehnquist + White 80.7% 69.7% <.01 18.18
Rehnquist + Scalia 78.4% 66.3% <.01 19.33
White + Powell 78.0% 64.1% <.01 21.94
O'Connor + Kennedy 77.8% 64.8% <.01 20.39
Scalia + Kennedy 77.8% 72.1% <.01 9.26
Brennan + Blackmun 77.2% 54.7% <.01 34.61
Souter + Ginsburg 77.0% 79.3% <.01 -3.94
Marshall + Blackmun 76.8% 56.4% <.01 31.33
Rehnquist + Thomas 76.8% 68.3% <.01 13.49
A p-value at <.05 indicates that the difference is statistically significant at the 5%
level, meaning that there is less than a 5% chance that the difference was due to chance
alone. All but three of the results met this standard (the three results that were not
significant are in bold). A p-value at <.01 indicates that there is less than a 1% chance
that the difference was due to chance alone.
[Vol. 69:1
CERTIORARI AND THE MERITS
Significance of Change in Rate of Agreement
in Votes on the Merits and Certiorari*
Pairing Merits Cert P-Value T-Statistic
Average Average
Stevens + Ginsburg 75.9% 69.6% <.01 10.01
White + Kennedy 75.8% 58.4% <.01 26.64
White + O'Connor 75.4% 71.6% <.01 6.09
Kennedy + Souter 75.1% 65.8% <.01 14.46
White + Souter 73.5% 59.0% <.01 21.97
Powell + Scalia 73.5% 50.0% <.01 35.24
O'Connor + Souter 72.9% 63.5% <.01 14.33
Kennedy + Thomas 71.9% 68.5% <.01 5.25
Powell + Blackmun 71.3% 60.6% <.01 16.05
O'Connor + Scalia 71.2% 61.2% <.01 14.99
Rehnquist + Souter 71.1% 62.6% <.01 12.84
Blackmun + Stevens 70.3% 59.7% <.01 15.79
Brennan + Stevens 70.3% 60.3% <.01 14.92
White + Scalia 69.9% 58.0% <.01 17.65
O'Connor+ Ginsburg 69.8% 65.2% <.01 6.88
Marshall + Stevens 69.8% 61.3% <.01 12.70
Blackmun+Ginsburg 68.2% 71.7% <.01 -5.41
White + Thomas 67.8% 70.3% <.01 -3.82
Burger + Blackmun 66.8% 50.0% <.01 24.46
Rehnquist + Ginsburg 66.7% 53.3% <.01 9.44
* A p-value at <.05 indicates that the difference is statistically significant at the 5%
level, meaning that there is less than a 5% chance that the difference was due to chance
alone. All but three of the results met this standard (the three results that were not
significant are in bold). A p-value at <.01 indicates that there is less than a 1% chance
that the difference was due to chance alone.
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Significance of Change in Rate of Agreement
in Votes on the Merits and Certiorari*
Pairing Merits Cert P-Value T-Statistic
Average Average
Scalia + Souter 65.8% 64.1% <.05 2.53
O'Connor + Thomas 65.5% 61.8% <.01 5.45
Blackmun + Souter 64.9% 62.9% <.01 2.94
White + Blackmun 64.5% 66.0% <.05 -2.23
Kennedy + Ginsburg 64.4% 58.7% <.01 8.29
Stevens + Souter 62.2% 60.5% <.05 2.47
Scalia + Ginsburg 62.1% 65.2% <.01 -4.55
Blackmun +O'Connor 60.5% 61.9% <.05 -2.03
White + Stevens 60.4% 50.1% <.01 14.74
Souter + Thomas 60.1% 61.0% n.s. -1.29
Powell + Brennan 59.1% 49.8% <.01 13.23
Powell + Stevens 57.9% 49.5% <.01 11.95
Stevens + O'Connor 57.8% 50.3% <.01 10.68
Blackmun + Kennedy 57.7% 56.7% n.s. 1.43
Powell + Marshall 57.0% 47.3% <.01 13.75
Stevens + Kennedy 56.5% 51.1% <.01 7.65
Brennan + White 55.7% 48.9% <.01 9.65
Rehnquist + Blackmun 55.0% 59.4% <.01 -6.29
Burger + Stevens 54.8% 46.1% <.01 12.36
* A p-value at <.05 indicates that the difference is statistically significant at the 5%
level, meaning that there is less than a 5% chance that the difference was due to chance
alone. All but three of the results met this standard (the three results that were not
significant are in bold). A p-value at <.01 indicates that there is less than a 1% chance
that the difference was due to chance alone.
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Significance of Change in Rate of Agreement
in Votes on the Merits and Certiorari*
Pairing Merits Cert P-Value T-Statistic
Average Average
Marshall + Souter 54.6% 48.8% <.01 8.18
Marshall + White 54.0% 51.0% <.01 4.25
Burger + Brennan 53.9% 36.3% <.01 25.45
Brennan + Kennedy 53.7% 41.1% <.01 18.04
Brennan + O'Connor 53.2% 41.9% <.01 16.10
Rehnquist + Stevens 53.0% 41.0% <.01 17.15
Thomas + Ginsburg 52.9% 57.6% <.01 -6.69
Marshall + Kennedy 51.2% 47.2% <.01 5.66
Marshall + O'Connor 50.6% 44.6% <.01 8.51
Burger + Marshall 49.4% 42.5% <.01 9.82
Blackmun + Scalia 49.2% 54.1% <.01 -6.94
Stevens + Scalia 48.9% 49.1% n.s. -0.28
Rehnquist + Brennan 48.0% 40.6% <.01 10.56
Brennan + Scalia 47.5% 45.6% <.01 2.69
Rehnquist + Marshall 45.6% 42.3% <.01 4.70
Marshall + Scalia 45.0% 46.5% <.05 -2.13
Blackmun + Thomas 44.4% 57.5% <.01 -18.62
Stevens + Thomas 42.3% 56.2% <.01 -19.79
* A p-value at <.05 indicates that the difference is statistically significant at the 5%
level, meaning that there is less than a 5% chance that the difference was due to chance
alone. All but three of the results met this standard (the three results that were not
significant are in bold). A p-value at <.01 indicates that there is less than a 1% chance
that the difference was due to chance alone.
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Appendix D
Cases Granted Unanimously and By Minority*
Cases Granted Unanimously
Term Total Total Decided Affirmed
Granted** Granted on Merits
Unanimously 5-4
1993 84 23 8 2
1992 85 23 2 1
1991 105 18 5 2
1988 119 16 7 5
1984 146 9 1 0
Average 16.5% of total 25.8% of 43.5% of
cases granted cases granted unanimous
were granted unanimously grants that
unanimously were decided were decided
5-4 5-4 were
affirmed
In selecting the five terms sampled, we chose the three most recent terms plus two
terms from the 1980s. We opted for 1988 and 1984 because the Court's personnel was
stable both in those terms and the terms immediately succeeding them.
The total number of cases granted includes cases with signed opinions and orally
argued per curiams. The number reflects the term in which the cases were granted.
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* In selecting the five terms sampled, we chose the three most recent terms plus two
terms from the 1980s. We opted for 1988 and 1984 because the Court's personnel was
stable both in those terms and the terms immediately succeeding them.
** The total number of cases granted includes cases with signed opinions and orally
argued per curiams. The number reflects the term in which the cases were granted.
Cases Granted By Minority*




1993 84 21 5 3
1992 85 20 12 5
1991 105 32 13 4
1988 119 32 10 2
1984 146 52 20 11
Average 29.1% of 38.2% of cases 41.7% of
total cases granted by a minority grants
granted minority were that were
were decided decided
granted by a unanimously unanimously
minority were affirmed
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